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I. INTRODUCTION
The challenge that brings us together is implicit in the title
of this Symposium: "Established and Emerging Rights: Ex-
ploring Juvenile Rights Under the Constitution." Our topic is
juvenile rights, but the underlying dilemma is how to incor-
porate these rights into an existing framework of established
constitutional law. The experiences of abolitionists and
women's suffragists teach us that the birthing process for
new rights is far from easy or painless. Even within the same
polity or the same family, each new generation of rights seek-
ers will encounter resistance from established rights bearers.
We tend to perceive rights as a zero-sum game in which oth-
ers' gains are our losses, rather than as a common enterprise
in which each new right adds value to its neighbors. Even if
emerging rights were welcomed into the community with open
arms, the incorporation of new rights into an established
constitutional scheme would pose formidable challenges of
harmonization, re-balancing, and integration.
Children and juveniles are the newest kids on the human
rights block. Only ten years ago, the 1989 United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child' first articulated a
comprehensive scheme of rights specifically tailored to juve-
niles. Today, the U.N. Convention has been adopted by every
nation in the world community except the United States.
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However, recognition of children's rights on an international
scale is a beginning, not an ending. Each political commu-
nity makes rights real through incorporation2 into the con-
stitutions and laws of nations and states and through ac-
ceptance. The process of incorporating the next generation of
rights-bearers into the world's constitutions is taking place,
in many stages and variations, all around the globe. In the
United States, however, advocates seeking to secure a place
for children in the constitutional scheme face substantial
doctrinal and political barriers.
The doctrinal barriers are complex and rooted in our own
Constitution's peculiar history and structure. Our written
Constitution is silent on rights for juveniles, and many schol-
ars and judges harbor great skepticism about the legitimacy
of incorporating un-enumerated rights into the constitutional
scheme. Parental rights established a constitutional foothold
seventy-five years ago, during the heyday of substantive due
process, in cases like Meyer v. Nebraska3 and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters.4 But the same door may not be open to rights for
children. Controversy over the Supreme Court's role in
enunciating rights in the context of economics, labor, and,
more recently, abortion has made judges wary of additional
claims that substantive rights can be incorporated by judicial
interpretation into the due process clause's guarantees
against state deprivations of life, liberty and property. After
extending heightened scrutiny beyond race to laws burdening
other classes such as women and illegitimate children, it
seems that the Justices have grown weary of discovering new
.suspect classes," making it difficult to use the Constitution
to challenge differential treatment of children as a class.
The political barriers are obvious. Children do not vote.
In addition, many conservatives reject the concept of rights
for children as a threat to family values. Conversely, critics
on the left fear that rights for children will be used to invade
family privacy and threaten women's autonomy. Finally,
Americans harbor deeply ambivalent feelings towards chil-
dren. While our rhetoric makes children our highest priority,
we rate very low on the scale of industrialized nations when It
comes to making these promises a reality. Racism and eco-
2 "Incorporation" is a term of art in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, referring to
the process of discerning which parts of the Bill of Rights should be binding on state
governments as well as the federal government, because Implicitly "Incorporated" In
the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantees of "due process." I use the term "incorpo-
ration" in a broader sense, to describe the process of bringing emerging rights into a
new or existing constitutional scheme.
3 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
4 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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nomics complicate all of our political responses, including our
responses to children's rights. We tend to see children in
shades of rich and poor, black and white, and "them" against"us." Our own children are our most precious personal pos-
sessions. Other people's children are armed and dangerous,
alien and out of control. No wonder Americans have trouble
knowing what to do with this newest claim of rights.
Recently, while visiting the Republic of South Africa
("South Africa" or "RSA"), I was struck by the contrast be-
tween the American and South African Constitutional treat-
ment of rights. However marginalized many children and
their families may remain economically, their legal status is
clear. An explicit and detailed Bill of Rights for children is in-
corporated into the new South African Constitution.5 Why, I
wondered, should the notion of constitutional rights for chil-
dren be so transparent in one setting and remain so highly
contested in the other? I began to ponder the various ways in
which emerging claims of rights find their way into national
constitutions. This paper is the result. This paper, compar-
ing two very different experiences, that of South Africa and
that of the United States, has application beyond the specific
topic of rights for juveniles. It focuses attention on a range of
elements that seem to ease or complicate the process of
bringing each succeeding generation of claimants into the
world of constitutional rights.
The South African and United States constitutions differ in
many respects. The U.S. Constitution is over two hundred
years old while South Africa's is barely three years old. In
addition, the process of drafting was markedly different. The
U.S. Constitutional Convention gathered several dozen prop-
ertied white men in Philadelphia to deliberate and draft their
document in strictest secrecy. Not only social but also geo-
graphical distance burdened communications between the
drafters and their constituencies. The U.S. Bill of Rights was
an afterthought. By contrast, the drafting of the new South
African Constitution involved the entire populace of South Af-
rica and their Bill of Rights took a place of pride. If you log
onto the South African Constitutional Assembly's web site,
you will find megabytes of discussion papers, proposals by
Non-Governmental Organizations ("NGOs"), letters from
school children, and oral communications to the Constitu-
tional Assembly hotline from citizens of every class and color.6
The U.S. Constitution is quite short- only about 8,000
s See S. AFPR. CONsr. of 1996. ch. 2. § 28.
6 South African Constitutional Assembly Home Page (visited Aug. 27. 1999)
<http://www.constitution.org.za>.
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words- and often frustratingly vague. The 1996 Constitu-
tion of the Republic of South Africa ("South African Constitu-
tion") is easily ten times longer, with fourteen exhaustive
chapters, totaling two-hundred and forty three detailed sec-
tions, followed by forty pages of tables and schedules.! Even
more than other modem constitutions, it contains explicit
provisions defining the relation between government and
family and between individuals within the family: rights of
privacy and reproductive choice; protection against discrimi-
nation based on sex, marital status, pregnancy, sexual ori-
entation and age; protections of linguistic and cultural val-
ues; and protection of such economic rights as housing and
education that are central to family survival and children's
development.' Explicitly embracing the newest category of
rights-bearers, the RSA Constitution provides a detailed list-
ing of the rights of children.9 By contrast, the U.S. Constitu-
tion's text is silent as to virtually all of these important Is-
sues. Not only is it silent as to children's rights, it says
nothing about gender and age discrimination, pre nancy and
reproduction, or the rights of parents and families.
The RSA Constitution is explicit not only about the sub-
stance of rights, but also about numerous procedural and ju-
risprudential issues such as standing and interpretation." It
makes various rights binding not only on public but also on
private action, and establishes government structures for
monitoring and enforcing these rights.'2 By contrast, the U.S.
Constitution is silent, restrictive or ambiguous regarding the
scope, application and enforcement of rights. The South Afri-
can document includes careful instructions on its interpreta-
tion, and many provisions that constitute "tests" to apply in
See Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1295,
1295 (1997).
8 See, e.g., S. AFR. CONsT. of 1996, ch. 2. §§ 9 (equality), 12(2) (bodily integrity
and reproductive freedom), 15 (religious and customary family law), 16(2) (protection
from race- and gender-based hate speech), 18 (freedom of association), 26 (right to
housing and protection from eviction), 27 (health care, food and water, social secu-
rity), 28 (children's rights), 29 (education), 30 (protection of language and culture).
See id. at ch. 2, § 28 (children's rights).
10 The Preamble states that one constitutional purpose is "to secure the blessings
of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," U.S. CONST. preamble, but the only explicit
prohibitions against sex and age discrimination in the U.S. Constitution are con-
tained in the Nineteenth and Twenty-sixth Amendments which respectively extended
the right to vote to women and citizens age eighteen and over. U.S. CONST. amends.
X, XXV.
1 See, e.g., S. AFR CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, §§ 38 (listing who may appear before the
Court), 39 (providing clauses to interpret the Bill of Rights).
12 See, e.g., id. at ch. 2, § 38(a) (stating that "[anyone acting in their own interest"
may approach the court); ch. 9, § 181(1) (outlining the various state institutions de-
signed to "strengthen constitutional democracy in the Republic").
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situations where competing rights and interests clash.1 3 Here
again, the U.S. document provides only minimal guidance,
leaving a vacuum that has been filled over the centuries by
elaborate constructions of judicial interpretation.
In spite of this silence, a large body of U.S. constitutional
law protecting or shaping family life has emerged gradually
from "between the lines" of the written Constitution. Many of
the principles made explicit in the RSA Constitution have
long been a part of U.S. constitutional doctrine. Both sys-
tems have traveled the road from officially sanctioned racial-
ist and patriarchal laws to a rejection of dejure racism and
sexism and a redefinition of basic principles like freedom,
equality, and property to include the interests of those previ-
ously excluded. A comparison of the paths each nation has
followed in redefining rights provides insights into the bene-
fits and costs of two methods of constitutional change in re-
sponse to emerging claims of human rights: (1) growth
through an incremental process of judicial interpretation and
re-interpretation- the predominant United States model-
and (2) growth at a transformational moment through enact-
ment of explicit and specific written provisions- the new
South African model. How has the growth process shaped
the form of constitutional law in each of these settings, and
how is form likely to influence the process of regenerating
rights, and thus the direction and shape of future substantive
growth?
Professor Frederick Schauer recently commented on the
relation of textual form to substantive outcomes, pointing for
his example to the U.S. and RSA Constitutions.'4 As he
points out, much depends on how one perceives the process
of adjudication. Both the "legal realist" and the "critical legal
studies" proponent, Schauer suggests, would conclude that
specificity or generality of a text should have little effect on
outcomes, since outcomes are essentially political.'5 Con-
versely, the "formalist" or "textualist" would believe that dif-
ferences in textual style ought to produce significant differ-
ences in outcomes.' 6 Of course, no simple dichotomy can
adequately capture the complex methods that characterize
judges' attempts to maintain both fidelity and flexibility in
interpreting a constitutional text in America and elsewhere.
Constitutional scholars have brought new tools and increas-
ing sophistication to the project of analyzing what judges in
13 See ir. at ch. 2, § 39 (Interpretation of Bill of Rights7).
14 See Schauer, supra note 7. at 1295-98.
15 See Id. at 1296.
16 See Id. at 1298.
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various national systems actually do when confronted with
the task of "applying" or "interpreting" texts.1 7  They have
probed more critically the effects of history and the context in
which judges operate. They have asked what the form, dis-
course, and rhetoric of judges' written opinions conveys
about the relationship of decisions to the legal texts on which
they are based. They have explored what decisional law says
about the legal culture that produces it. Scholars such as
Mitchell de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser employ the techniques of literary
theory to challenge the common wisdom that judges choose
between two incompatible modes of analysis, either ap-
proaching texts from a position of rigid textualism or treating
them as invitations to free-wheeling judicial policy-making.
They have demonstrated that the form of a text and the ac-
cepted conventions surrounding its interpretation tell only a
part of the complex story conveyed by judicial discourse.
Nevertheless, the form adopted by the drafters of a constitu-
tion inevitably both affects and reflects assumptions about
the scope and shape of constitutional interpretation, and in-
fluences the outcomes in constitutional cases.' 9
Observers commonly note that the American constitu-
tional experience has been shaped by the generality that
characterizes many parts of the document. In the United
States, constitutionalization of new rights often occurs by in-
1 Professor Mitchel Lasser employs the tools of literary theory to show how judges
in both French and U.S. systems combine textually oriented and policy oriented dis-
course to portray adjudication as both inherently stable and socially responsive. See
Mitchel de S.-O.-rE. Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put to the Test: A Comparative Literary
Analysis of American Judicial Tests and French Judicial Discourse, 111 HARV. L. REV.
689 (1998); see also LOURENS DU PLESSIS & HUGH CORDER, UNDERSTANDING SOUTH
AFRICA'S TRANSITIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 60-107 (1994) (using hermeneutic analysis to
critique the purposive interpretation suggested in chapter three of the interim Con-
stitution). Cf. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION
AND AMERICAN LAW 173-193 (1990) (examining how principles from science, social
science, philosophy and literary theory are present in the legal treatment of differ-
ence).
:8 See generally Lasser, supra note 17.
19 Professor Schauer argues that fidelity to the text does not foreclose and some-
times even demands readings based on judicial perceptions of morality or overarch-
ing policy, but he contends that the text should be "the primary signaler of moral
and non-moral readings. .. ." Schauer, supra note 7, at 1312.
20 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996) (exploring how this generality allows for a moral
reading of the Constitution); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE
CONSTITUTION (1991) (assuming this level of generality as a starting point in their
analysis of the structure of the debate over differing modes of constitutional inter-
pretation); KErrH E. WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING.
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999) ('Although the clauses and structures
that make up the text cannot be simply empty of meaning, for they are clearly recog-
nizable as language, the meaning that they do convey may be so broad and unde-
termined as to be incapable of faithful reduction to legal rules.").
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cremental interpretation, involving detours and dead ends,
abdications of duty and spurts of activism. Nowhere is this
more true than in the constitutionalization of family rights.
Over the past half century, the U.S. Supreme Court's inter-
pretations of the open-textured language of the Bill of Rights
and of the Civil War Amendments have created an ad hoc
edifice of family-related rights that has reshaped our under-
lying conceptions of relations between family members and
relations between the family and the state. Because of their
reliance on implicit norms rather than explicit language,
these rights are controversial and even members of the U.S.
Supreme Court question their status." They are constantly
subject to revocation through outright overruling, or to piece-
meal dismantling by re-interpretation. These family-related
rights are protected only by the doctrine of stare decisis- a
principle never mentioned in the U.S. Constitution.2
This paper compares the formal status of children, the
newest competitors for a place at the table of rights, under
the U.S. and South African constitutions. I do not mean to
suggest that rights necessarily translate into justice or that
children's actual lives match the images presented in the le-
gal discourse- in both the United States and South Africa,
the rhetoric of respect is contradicted by the reality of margi-
nalization, rejection, abuse and neglect. I do argue, however.
that a constitution's form, discourse and rhetoric can and do
influence the construction of new rights. First, I will examine
the history of rights for children in the U.S., which developed
in the process not of drafting but of interpreting the text. I
will look at avenues for constitutional growth in the U.S.
system and trace the erratic path that U.S. constitutional law
of the family has traveled. I will pay special attention to the
relation of the U.S. Constitution's form to the process of judi-
cial interpretation employed in formulating the doctrines
which have given birth to new rights for subjugated groups.
Advocates for people of color, women and children have used
the open textured phrases of the Constitution to reshape the
law by redefining notions of liberty, equality, and property in
the U.S. Constitution to make them responsive to evolving
social perceptions of human rights. This same generality,
however, has allowed development of theories, such as eco-
nomic substantive due process, grounded in notions of vested
21 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833. 980-1002 (1992) (Scalia. J..
dissenting) (questioning whether the concept of "liberty' includes the right of a
woman to terminate her pregnancy before bringing the fetus to term).
22 See id. at 854-69 (opinion of the Court) (discussing the rare circumstances that
justify the Court's decision to overrule established precedent).
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property rights.
Substantive due process theory- whether the economic
strand protecting vested property rights or the privacy and
fundamental rights strands protecting vested liberties- en-
courages entrenchment of tradition, rather than challenging
traditional divisions of wealth and power. Since rights are
treated as a zero-sum game, each new class of rights-bearers
who are able to battle their way into the safe haven of the
U.S. Constitution must become a gate-keeper, excluding
those who wish to follow. This is especially evident in the
arena of family rights. In constitutionalizing parental rights,
American law, I will suggest, became trapped in the amber of
a specific historical moment- the Lochner era. It remains
burdened by the conservative legacy that first gave us sub-
stantive due process theory. By conceptualizing the child as
a form of private property, and the parent-child relationship
as a private liberty interest of the parent, the Court gave con-
stitutional force to traditional hierarchies of power and
erected barriers to the recognition of children's rights that
advocates for children are now struggling to dismantle.
Next, I will sketch out the process of research, drafting,
and public consultation that lead to the inclusion of rights for
children in the South African Constitution's Bill of Rights. I
will suggest, not surprisingly, that the process- which has
been described as a "revolution.. . negotiated between the
oppressor and the oppressed"2- - contributed to the creation
of a very explicit text in which children earned a special place
because of their role in South Africa's struggle against apart-
heid.
Finally, I will examine how the differences produced by
process and form have played out in the two different systems
in the context of a particular claim of rights- children's
rights to be protected from abuse. Americans, I will argue,
must learn from South Africa's experience if we are to re-
invigorate the U.S. Constitution and reshape our approach to
constitutional interpretation to hear and embrace rather than
to suppress emerging claims of human rights.
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF CONSTITUTIONALIZING NEW
RIGHTS
Children have few clearly articulated or firmly established
constitutional rights in the United States of America. Chil-
dren enjoy few independent rights outside the context of
WA See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
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criminal or administrative proceedings, because children's
rights (generally called "interests") are conceptualized as sub-
sumed within the rights of parents. Children's interests are
defined by parents, who exercise their constitutionally pro-
tected rights to physical custody and control of children's up-
bringing. Children have succeeded in asserting rights in
various narrow areas, which are confined primarily to crimi-
nal procedure and equal protection law and based entirely in
decisional doctrines rather than text.25 If children have few
"first generation rights," they have absolutely no "second gen-
eration rights."26 They enjoy no federal constitutional rights
to education or to programs of protection from abuse and ex-
ploitation, and no rights to the basic nutrition, income sup-
ports, shelter, and health care on which the right to life obvi-
ously depends. Children's federal welfare entitlements,
addressed only by statute, have been increasingly "privatized"
by Congress in keeping with contemporary market theories.'
As noted earlier, the U.S. Senate has refused to consider rati-
fication of the U.N. Convention, in large part because of op-
position from conservatives and the religious right, who claim
that the Convention would undermine constitutional rights of
parents to raise their children as they see fit, and that the
recognition of socio-economic rights would deprive parents
and local governments of autonomy while draining state and
private resources.'
24 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 233-34 (1972) (holding that parents
control a child's free exercise claim except "if it appears that parental decisions will
jeogardize the health or safety of the child.").
See, e.g., In re Gault. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing juvenile rights to notice of
charges, to counsel, to confrontation and to cross-examination of witnesses).
Many South African writers use terminology for discussing rights which differs
somewhat from typical terminology of 'negative" and 'positive" rights often used by
American scholars. "First generation" or "blue' rights are those associated with lib-
eral democracies and include rights of political participation. 'Second generation" or
"red" rights are socio-economic rights. such as rights to shelter and medical care.
'Third generation" or "green" rights are environmental rights. Distinction is also
drawn between "negative" rights and "programmatic" rights, the former operating
negatively as restrictions on government action, and the latter requiring positive gov-
ernment action to create programs that vindicate rights. As in the United States.
critics have attacked this distinction, pointing out that many so-called negative
rights involve positive action by government. See DION BASSON. SOUTH AF icAS
INrERIM CONSrrrUTON: TEx TAND NOTES 19-21 (1995).
27 See Alexia Pappas. Note. Welfare Reform: Child Welfare or the Rhetoric of Re-
sponsibility?. 45 DUKE L.J. 1301. 1301-02 (1996) ('The Clinton/Republican direction
of welfare reform, by focusing on parental behavior control, threatens to nullify the
vital progress that child-centered policy has made toward protecting the well-being of
poor children.").
28 See generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child: Cultural and Political Barriers to Ratifcation by the U.S.A.. in
CONTEMPORARY INTERNAtiONAL LAW ISSUES: NEv FORMS. NEW APPuCATIONS 420 (Why-
boo P. Heere ed., 1997); see also note 151 and accompanying text.
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What accounts for this striking judicial and political hos-
tility to children's rights, so different from the discourse
found in the new South African Constitution? In the follow-
ing section, I will offer some historical and legal background
on American constitutional law that may partially explain this
miscarriage of justice for children. I trust that readers al-
ready familiar with American constitutional history will par-
don me for rehearsing familiar facts and arguments and for
my necessarily selective and subjective account of American
law, knowing that what I offer is only one among many com-
peting versions. I will begin by discussing the process of con-
stitutional change through interpretation. While this process
is just beginning for South Africa's Constitution, it provides
the bulk of American constitutional law. Judicial decisions
have displaced much of the text, providing new texts and
outlining the methodology for discussing emerging rights.
A. Towards a More Perfect Union: Avenues for Constitutional
Growth
All constitutions are born imperfect. To believe otherwise
is to believe in human infallibility. It is also to believe in the
chimera of textual "plain meaning" divorced from interpretive
context.2 9 The U.S. Constitution is a compelling case in point.
As originally drafted, it had several flaws so serious that they
might well have been fatal. First, in weighing property inter-
ests and the interest in social stability against principles of
liberty and equality, our Constitution sacrificed justice in fa-
vor of order. While some critics contend that the South Afri-
can Constitution makes similar compromises by protecting
interests in property, the comparison is unfair. The most
glaring difference is the U.S. Constitution's express recogni-
tion and perpetuation of slavery- property interests in per-
sons.3 0 Second, and less widely discussed, the U.S. Consti-
tution, as originally promulgated in 1789, lacked any explicit
protection of what we now call fundamental or human rights.
While the first ten amendments, known as the "Bill of Rights,"
29 Surely the most amusing illustration of this truth is provided by Jordan Stelker
et al., Taking Text and Structure Really Seriously: Constitutional Interpretation and
the Crisis of Presidential Eligibility, 74 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1995), a parody that employs
a literal reading of the text of the U.S. Constitution to disqualify all persons born af-
ter 1789 from election to the Presidency of the United States.
30 See generally Dorothy E. Roberts, The Meaning of Blacks' Fidelity to the Constil-
tution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1761, 1763 (1997) (arguing that African-Americans' fi-
delity to the Constitution has never been grounded in the Constitution Itself but
rather in a commitment to its reformation through re-interpretation to effect a true
inclusion of all persons).
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were added in 1791, even the amended version of the Con-
stitution remained imperfect as a guardian of rights. A third
flaw was the Framers' casting of the new government in a
purely passive role, bound to respect pre-existing rights, but
not as an active agent in promoting, enforcing, and inter-
preting them.
From its inception, the U.S. Constitution allowed two pri-
mary avenues for evolution.3 One is explicitly set forth in the
process for formal amendment, described in Article V. This
process makes change extremely difficult, especially if the
change is controversial- as is always the case with new
claims of rights which threaten vested interests. Article V re-
quires a super-majority both to initiate the amendment proc-
ess and to ratify any new amendments. Like any authors,
the Framers must have wanted to minimize meddlesome ed-
iting. Their choice of methods for formal amendment is con-
sistent with the conservative thrust of the U.S. constitutional
scheme, which employed numerous checks and balances to
minimize the dangers of radical or imprudent change.
Given the difficulty of formal amendment, Americans
would have had to invent another avenue for protecting
emerging rights had it not already existed. The other primary
avenue for changing the United States Constitution has been
judicial interpretation of the constitutional text in the course
of judicial review of government laws and actions? Within
the U.S. legal culture, the power of judicial review, most fa-
mously articulated in the case of Marbury v. Madison," gives
the judiciary authority to strike down laws and government
actions if they violate norms embodied in the Constitution.
Since the United States Supreme Court, sitting in Washing-
ton, D.C., has appellate jurisdiction of such cases, Its nine
31 Various students of constitutional evolution and constitutional history have
defended the validity of additional unenumerated means of amending the Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 34-57 (1991) (dis-
cussing informal amendment through judicial re-interpretation); Akhul Reed Amar.
The Consent of the Governed: Constltutional Amendment Outside Article V. 94 COLU?, .
L. REV. 457, 487-494 (1994) (examining amendment by direct majority vote).
U.S. CONST. art. V.
A massive literature has grown up around the methods judges use to interpret
the meaning of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g.. DWORKIN, supra note 20. at 2 (as-
serting that a "moral reading ... brings political morality into the heart of constitu-
tional law"); ANTONIN SCAUA. A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAw 20-25 (1997) (arguing that the text rather than legislative intent should be the
method used to interpret statutes); Robert H. Bork. The Constitution. Original Intent.
and Economic Rights. 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823 (1986): Michael W. McConnell. The
Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Laur 98 YALE L J.
1501 (1998) (reviewing MICHAELJ. PERRY. MORALITY. POLTICS. AND LAW (1998)).
34 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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Justices are the ultimate arbiters of 'Vhat the law is."'
B. The Interpretive Process: Finding Meaning Between the
Lines
While the distinction between explaining (interpreting) and
rewriting (amending) the law may seem elusive, the common
law tradition has always relied on a gradual accretion of
precedent in successive cases, to flesh out the meaning of
laws and legal principles.m In contrast to many other con-
stitutional schemes, under Article III, the U.S. federal courts
may not consider hypothetical questions, or pass on the con-
stitutionality of a law before it is enacted.37 Courts may con-
sider only actual cases and controversies. Thus, the law is
inevitably shaped as much by the litigants and by their times,
as by the courts. Every constitutional case that reaches the
U.S. Supreme Court begins with an advocate whose client
has been directly affected by the law, standing before a trial
judge telling his or her unique story. Presented with a con-
crete dispute in a specific factual context, judges must give
meaning to the constitutional text, not in the abstract but as
it applies to a particular party and set of facts. Judges un-
derstand that each decision not only explains but potentially
.makes" new law.'m
American scholars and jurists have long debated various
theories to describe and justify the roles of judges in this pro-
cess. Many are made uneasy by the fact that the very proc-
ess of judicial interpretation poses risks that translations will
slide into substitutions and ultimately repudiations of the
text as originally written and intended. Scholars debate
whether it is possible to maintain fidelity to the words on the
parchment of the Constitution without sacrificing its larger
purposes. Political scientists worry about what has been
termed "the counter-majoritarian difficulty- the power of
35 Id at 167 ("It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is.").
36 Justice Antonin Scalia Indicts this very same common law tradition for having
instilled bad habits in American judges and lawyers, encouraging them to approach
statutory and constitutional texts as if they were judge made law. See SCALIA, supra
note 33, at 9-14.
37 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
Professor Lasser argues that, in the American system, the original constitu-
tional text is often displaced by a series of judicially created multi-pronged tests.
These tests assume the role of authoritative texts to be applied in subsequent cases,
creating the perception that law is inherently stable (because based on application of
a specific text to the problem at hand) but also socially responsive (because the test
incorporates examination of an array of external purposes and effects relevant to the
problem). See Lasser, supra note 17, at 702-35.
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judges, who are not elected, to strike down popular laws.m
On one extreme are "originalists" who believe judges should
be confined to applying the text according to its authors'
"original intent" or the "original meaning" of their words and
can thus avoid changing or expanding the law at all.4 On the
other, are "Critical Legal Scholars" who claim the text and its
framers' and ratifiers' intentions are so inherently subjective,
contingent, unknowable, diffuse and/or irrelevant that judges
should frankly admit they are imposing their own value
choices in the game of politics." A third approach would al-
low judges great authority to police the democratic process,
stepping in to correct failures of representation, but would
allow very little room to second-guess bad substantive results
if arrived at through good procedures. 2 Finally, many mod-
em U.S. scholars endorse an eclectic or pragmatic approach,
often called "practical reason" or "pragmatism," which em-
ploys a variety of methods to arrive at a functional and sensi-
ble reading. 3 In my view, there is some value to each of these
approaches, yet no single one of them adequately captures
what judges actually do, or even what they ought to do, in
applying constitutional norms.
The Framers gave us no owners' manual for the Bill of
See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEASr DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962)
(stating that "judicial review is a counter-majoritarlan force in our system').
40 The most prominent originalists acknowledge the subjectivity of original Intent
and focus instead on what meaning a reasonable reader at the time of the Constitu-
tional Convention would have given to the text. See ROBERr H. BORK. THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLrICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990) (arguing that Judges
must give the constitutional text whatever would have been Its generally accepted
meaning at the time of its adoption): SCALA. supra note 33, at 37-41 (arguing n fa-
vor of "original meaning" as the proper interpretive model).
41 This is a rather gross characterization of the arguments made far more subtly
by the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement. See. e.g.. MARK TUSHNEr. RED. ,VHrTE.
AND BLUE: A CRTICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSrTrUTIONAL LAW (1988) (critiquing textual In-
terpretivist, representation-reinforcing and normativist theories): Derrick A. Bell. Jr..
Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma. 93 HARV. L
REV. 518. 522-28 (1980) (describing the "subordination of law to interest group poli-
tics").
42 See generally JOHN HARr ELY. DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (expounding a
"Representation-Reinforcing" theory of judicial review). But cf. Gerard E. Lynch. Re-
view of John Hart Ely's Democracy and DIstrust 80 COLUM. L. REv. 857 (1980) (cri-
tiquing Ely's approach).
See RICHARD A. POSNER. THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 302-09 (1990) (argu-
ing that the Supreme Court's change of direction in interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment in Brown to strike down American apartheid is Justified not by technical
legal materials but by ethical and political ends such as "promoting social peace
through racial harmony.... finding a new institutional role for the Supreme Court
to replace the discredited one of protecting economic liberty; [and) breathing new life
into the equal protection clause); Daniel Farber & Phillip Frickey. Practical Reason
and the First Amendment 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615. 1645-56 (1987) (advancing practi-
cal reason over fundamental approaches).
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Rights. Nor can "history" tell us precisely what the Framers
intended. According to historians, debates about the respec-
tive importance of original intent, overarching purposes and
principles, and political pragmatism began well before the
Constitutional Convention and opinion was as divided during
the early years of the nation's history as it is today." Ac-
cording to some, the legal practice of the late eighteenth
century rarely focused on "original intent"- rather, "the pre-
vailing rules of construction... called for a closely reasoned
analysis of the text emphasizing manifest language, internal
consistency, and fidelity to general principles."4  Lawyers
were accustomed to the notion that "the 'intent' of any legal
document is the product of the interpretive process and not
some fixed meaning that the author locks into the docu-
ment's text at the outset."46 Yet, the creators of the Constitu-
tion did not ignore evidence of "original intent" when it suited
them to refer to it. In fact, members of the First Congress
turned to the legislative history, calling upon their own
memories of deliberations and their own and each others'
subjective intentions at the time of drafting, discussing or
signing the document, to argue the pros and cons of com-
peting interpretations of the constitutional text. And, as in
our times, these moves were answered by counter-arguments
citing the impossibility of identifying a specific original intent,
and the importance of interpreting constitutional language In
light of general principles, experience, and current exigen-
cies .48
An examination of U.S. Supreme Court opinions over the
past two hundred years provides convincing evidence that no
single method has dominated. The Court often relies on close
textual reading, but it has also played an active role in "ap-
ply[ing] values not articulated in the constitutional text"49 to
the resolution of constitutional questions. The results are
44 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUION (1997). Rakove shows how different players held differing views of
the interpretive process, and how key players, such as Madison or Hamilton,
changed their views and tactics according to the Issue at hand or in response to
pragmatic judgments. See id. at 339-65.
4 Id. at 349.
46 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 885, 910 (1985).
47 See RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 350 (describing an interaction in the First Con-
gress in which Alexander Hamilton disagreed with a member of the House of Repre-
sentative's argument that relied explicitly on the Federalist Papers).
48 Rakove quotes the mature Jefferson's statement that "forty years experience in
government Is worth a century of book-reading." See id. at 367 (internal citations
omitted).
49 Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703,
705 (1975).
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sometimes plainly inconsistent with a strict interpretation of
the text and hard to square with what we know of the draft-
ers' and ratifiers' specific intentions. The Supreme Court of-
ten overtly draws upon what it conceives as shared contem-
porary ideals about fairness and justice.5 I am not
suggesting, that the justices create these ideals out of whole
cloth- rather, the Court relies for its legitimacy on various
broad textual provisions about liberty, equality and human
rights located within the document, as well as upon infer-
ences drawn from the Constitution's structures and pur-
poses. The Court attempts to articulate and apply these val-
ues, "even when the content of these ideals is not expressed
as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution.";'
It is not my purpose, in this paper, to join in the nuanced
and complicated debates over precisely which method or
combination of methods of interpretation is "correct." I am
asserting here only that amendment through interpretation is
an historical fact of American jurisprudence. Personally, I be-
lieve the Framers and ratifiers understood the impossibility of
locking immutable understandings or intentions into the text
and understood that the interpretive process would continue
to shape the law, long after they were gone. They also agreed
on the strategy of keeping the text simple and focused on "es-
sential principles only; lest the operations of government
should be clogged by rendering those provisions permanent
and unalterable, which ought to be accommodated to times
and events.- 2 Over the course of time, perhaps to an extent
undreamed of by the Framers, the judiciary has become the
primary vehicle for "up-dating" textual meaning. Inevitably,
judges bring modem knowledge and evolving social and
moral sensibilities to defining and applying the document's
terms in contemporary contexts.
Judges, however, do not act in isolation. Their partners in
this enterprise are ordinary people, from the voters whose
choices influence judicial appointments and Senate confir-
mations, to the litigants and advocates who call upon the
50 School desegregation cases are one notable example. See Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (basing Its holding that "[separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal" upon the view that this separation creates a feeling of inferi-
ority). Other examples include cases involving the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment and cases discussing reproductive choice. See
Grey, supra note 49, at 708-09, 711-12 (noting that the rights relied on by the Court
in these cases cannot be derived from the interpretation of the text of the Constitu-
tion).
51 Grey, supra note 49, at 706.
RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 342 (quoting from the advice of Edmund Randolph to
the Committee of Detail at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia).
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courts to confront emerging constitutional problems. Al-
though this concept of judges as interpreters and translators
of the U.S. Constitution gives the judiciary great power, that
power is checked and balanced in ways, both practical and
political, which I would argue are sufficient to mitigate the
dangers of abuse. The primary check on judicial power Is the
fact that judges are embedded in a particular legal culture. It
is the judge's commitment to and training in a craft of judg-
ing which obligates her to perform her task with circumspec-
tion, consistency, impartiality, and restraint, to truly hear
and respond in good faith to reasoned argument, and to ex-
plain and justify her conclusions in written opinions.' This
is the system we have developed, for better or worse. I will
use the general term "constitutional interpretation" to signify
this amalgam of approaches that judges in the American
common law tradition actually use in attempting to draw
meaning from the constitutional text.
C. Formal Amendment and the Bill of Rights:
The Interplay of Specificity and Silence
I have highlighted two primary avenues for change of the
U.S. Constitution. Often, they have played complementary
roles- silences or ambiguities within the text have generated
controversial interpretations followed by a call for formal
amendment. Amendments, in their turn, have created new
pockets of silence or ambiguity, generating more interpreta-
tions. In the United States' experience, much as during the
South African transition, silences in the text created a de-
mand for formal amendment almost before the ink was dry.
In 1789, the drafters emerged from two years of extremely se-
cretive work, to present their document for ratification by "the
People." They quickly learned that ratification would not be
possible without certain key changes, yet a new Constitu-
tional Convention would have opened a Pandora's box of
problematic issues. As a compromise, the Federalists prom-
ised to propose amendments to the document during the new
government's first Congress, and in 1791 the Constitution
was expanded by adding a "Bill of Rights"- really eight sub-
stantive amendments plus two amendments providing canons
of interpretation. The history behind these first ten amend-
ments illustrates the inherent tension between the certainty
See Robin West. Integrity and Universality: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin's
Freedom's Law, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1313, 1317 (1997) (arguing that interpretation
is constrained by principles of legal justice, including consistency).
See generally RAKOVE supra note 44, at 94-160.
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and stability provided by specific enumeration and the flexi-
bility and social responsiveness provided by silence and by
open textured phrases. It also illustrates the central role the
Framers expected constitutional interpretation, as well as
formal amendment, would play in subsequent constitutional
development.
The purpose of these early amendments was to make ex-
plicit to doubters wary of the new federal government what
the Federalists, who supported the Constitution, claimed was
implicit and needed no clarification. The original document
was primarily concerned with enumerating federal powers
and setting up a tripartite federal government of checks and
balances. It said very little either about state powers or about
fundamental rights, although both of these principles were
implicit in the larger scheme, as significant checks on federal
power. The Anti-Federalists feared that, without explicit pro-
hibitions, the new federal government might abuse its enu-
merated powers to violate the fundamental rights of the peo-
ple or to aggrandize federal authority in violation of state
sovereignty. The Federalists argued that no specific text pre-
serving individual or states' rights was necessary, since any
powers and rights which the federal government was not ex-
plicitly granted obviously must remain with the States and
the People. They argued that specifying protected rights
would be a mistake, because it would suggest to future read-
ers that those rights not enumerated were not protected.55
Likewise, enumerating state powers would suggest that those
not enumerated could be exercised by the federal govem-
ment. To satisfy their critics, however, the Federalists drafted
eight Amendments enumerating specific rights, including re-
ligious liberty, freedom of speech, property rights, freedom
from cruel and unusual punishments and many more. They
also added two other amendments clarifying that issues not
specifically addressed by the text were to be interpreted in
light of the overarching principles of fundamental rights and
federalism. The Ninth Amendment states a canon of inter-
pretation embodying the principle of fundamental rights:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."' This same phrase, was borrowed by South Africa's
55 For a discussion of this debate, see RAKOVE. supra note 44. at 288-89 & nn. 1 &
2.
w U.S. CONST. amend. IX. Cf. S. AFR. CONST. of 1996. ch. 2. § 39(3) (-'he Bill of
Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recog-
nized or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent they
are consistent with the Bill.") Both the RSA and the U.S. provisions are ambiguous
about the status of newly "discovered" or emerging rights.
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constitutional convention with the added caveat that retained
or pre-existing rights must be consistent with the new Bill of
Rights. 7 The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution pro-
vides a canon of interpretation embodying the principle of
federalism: that powers not granted the federal government
are retained by the States.- Some judges and scholars re-
gard the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as meaningless tau-
tologies. To me, they read as confirmation that the Framers
never expected their document to provide an encyclopedic
enumeration and always assumed it would be interpreted ac-
cording to underlying structural context and overarching
philosophical purposes. More importantly, the purposes of a
constitution would be defeated by a requirement that all
things not explicitly included are thereby excluded 9
Perhaps the most influential proponent of this view was
Chief Justice John Marshall, who led the United States Su-
preme Court through its formative period. In McCulloch v.
Maryland, he stated: "It would [be] an unwise attempt to pro-
vide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at
all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best pro-
vided for as they occur."6° The question presented was
whether the federal government possessed the power to in-
corporate a National Bank. The Court rejected the argument
that the failure to specify such a power in the text must be
interpreted as denying such authority to Congress. Instead,
Marshall opted for pragmatism and flexibility, pointing to the
clause vesting in Congress the authority "to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper" for the execution of its
enumerated powers."
The interpretive process I have described plays a signifi-
cant role in every arena of constitutional law, from separation
of powers to federalism. It makes its most dramatic and
controversial appearances when dealing with unenumerated
57 See S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 39(3).
See U.S. CONST. amend. X ('The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by It to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people.").
59 There is a place for the useful canon of interpretation, "Expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius," but it is only one of many tools for reading a text and is contradicted
by other equally important canons. See generally Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in
SCALIA, supra note 33. at 95-114 (discussing European experience with canons of
interpretation and their importance in the interpretive process).
60 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819). Marshall made this statement in connection with the
argument that, had the Framers intended to empower the federal government to cre-
ate a bank, they would have said so explicitly. Such arguments in favor of open-
ended construction of enumerated federal powers become even more compelling in
the context of rights. In this case, Marshall made his famous statement "Iwle must
never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding .... Id. at 407.
61 Id.
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rights. In American constitutional history, repeatedly we
have seen subjugated members of society draw upon the gen-
eral themes of protection of liberty, property and equality.
seeking to "re-constitute" the legal principles governing the
institutions which perpetuate their subjugation. Advocates
for the rights of people of color, women, and children, have all
been engaged in a struggle to reshape old institutions. These
subjugated groups have challenged institutional norms
grounded in concepts of hierarchy and ownership and have
argued for rules predicated on more egalitarian concepts in
keeping with evolving values. Often, the Supreme Court has
employed the open textured language given to us by the
Framers to allow constitutional law to evolve with changing
conceptions of liberty, property, and equality.
Why should one be concerned about a constitution's ca-
pacity for change? Why not simply enforce the explicit and
specific intentions of its drafters? Examining the United
States' two-hundred year-old experience, and even the very
young South African experience, the answer should be obvi-
ous. The process of constitution-making involves bargains
and compromises which may be necessary but should not be
written in stone. As noted earlier, the Constitutional text of
1789 lacked the broad statements about equality found in the
more revolutionary Declaration of Independence of 1776.
This is hardly surprising since the delegates who opposed
slavery had been forced to strike a bargain which continues
to haunt us two hundred years later. In order to reassure the
Southern states, the Constitution explicitly acknowledged the
enforceability of state laws which treated humans as prop-
erty, and it granted protection to the trade in human beings.;
Slavery was not the only deprivation of liberty or example
of entrenched inequality in the Framer's world. It was simply
the most glaring and controversial. Many other inequalities
remained virtually invisible to eighteenth-century eyes and
were simply accepted as natural, and not man-made. Tho-
mas Jefferson and his co-authors acted in good faith when
they penned the Declaration of Independence, proclaiming
that "all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator
See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. cl. 3 ("No Person held to Service or Labour in one
State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall. in Consequence on any
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour ... I]. In
other provisions, it provided that persons of color be counted as three fifths of a per-
son in computing representation in Congress and taxation. Id. art. 1. § 2. cl. 3 (Rep-
resentatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States... ac-
cording to their respective Numbers. which shall be determined by adding to the
whole Number of free persons... three fifths of all other persons.-).
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with certain inalienable rights."6 Jefferson quite consciously
did not include the enslaved African-American male within
the company of "all men." But neither did he or the other
Framers mean to include women of any condition or color in
the promise of civil liberty and equality. And they certainly
did not mean to include children. Only a few of the Drafters
harbored any doubts at all about the equity or morality of the
categorical exclusion of women and children. The Drafters'
notion of "equality" was a far cry from today's internationally
recognized benchmark which assumes as a basic criterion of
self-determination a system guaranteeing "one person one
vote."
As this history illustrates, consent of the governed is not a
static concept. It is constantly challenged by evolving con-
ceptions of citizenship and personhood: Who are the "People"
whose consent is necessary to a just political order? A radi-
cal shift in how international law answers this question was
the driving force behind "the New South Africa" and the new
South African Constitution. As in the Old South Africa, in
the eighteenth-century culture of Revolutionary America,
those who believed they could speak for 'We the People" were,
by today's standards, a select elite. The representatives to
the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia as well as
those who voted to ratify the U.S. Constitution at the state
level, all were white, adult, property-owning males nominated
and elected by other white, adult, property-owning males.
Yet, they purported to speak for their entire region's popula-
tion. At the time, ordinary working people were considered
too unruly and unsophisticated to govern, and their voices
were channeled and filtered in ways that now seem pro-
foundly paternalistic.
The American experience shows how difficult it can be to
transcend the limitations of a flawed vision of vested property
rights and an incomplete vision of liberty and equality. In
1789, each of the subjugated and excluded categories
named- blacks, Indians, women, children, landless laborers,
indentured servants- were almost universally perceived as
lesser and limited beings. Often, they were not civil persons
at all, but rather a form of property or quasi-property, be-
longing to the patriarch or head of household, and subject to
his virtually unchecked authority.
These exclusions were challenged, one by one. First to be
heard, were slaves. The Constitution contained clauses
which made clear that slaves were a constitutionally recog-
r3 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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nized form of human property. As Roger Taney, an educated
and respected Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, wrote in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the owners of this
human property actually had the Constitution on their side
when they claimed a fundamental right to protection of their
ownership. 6' Women, children and free people of color were
treated, at worst, as quasi-property and, at best, with benign
condescension. They were believed lacking by their very na-
tare in the "capacity" to participate intelligenfly in civil life.
In contrast to South Africa's transitional moment, our origi-
nal moment occurred while the untruth of these beliefs was
still far from evident.
Neither the process of formal amendment nor the process
of judicial interpretation was able to cure the subjugation of
African-Americans. It took a Civil War to force a confronta-
tion with the evil of slavery. In the aftermath of the war, the
country began the remediation process with the Civil War
Amendments which forbade slavery, and prohibited the states
from depriving "any person" of equality or of life, liberty or
property without due process and guaranteed to adult "male"
citizens the right to vote.& These Amendments also expressly
provided Congress with the power to enforce these basic
rights.' This era marked a watershed in United States legal
history, explicitly engaging the federal powers in policing the
relationship of the states and their citizens, and opening the
door to enforcement of civil rights of all U.S. citizens at both
state and federal levels. The Supreme Court's subsequent
interpretations of the Civil War Amendments, especially the
Fourteenth Amendment, have provided the vehicle for giving
constitutional force to ideals of liberty and equality. The ex-
plicit protection of property has operated to provide stability.
But champions of the amendment process should be
careful about pointing to the Civil War Amendments as evi-
dence of its effectiveness. The Civil War Amendments, which
64 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 411 (1856) (The "Constitution... pointis] directly and
specifically to the negro race as a separate class of Persons ... .1.
U.S. CoNsr. amends. XIII ('Neither slavery nor nvoluntary servitude... shall
exist within the United States... .). MVX § 1 (-No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States:
nor shall any State deprive any person of life. liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law; nor deny to any person... the equal protection of the laws."). XV. § I
('The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.").
See U.S. CONSr. amends. XII. § 2 ("Congress shall have power to enforce this
article by appropriate legislation.), XIV. § 5 ('rhe Congress shall have the power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.). XV. § 2 ('"he Con-
gress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.).
JOURNAL OF CONSTITTIHONAL LAW
provide the foundation for much of our modem constitutional
jurisprudence, owe their ratification to the fact that the victo-
rious Northern states forced the vanquished Southern states
to vote for these Amendments as a condition of rejoining the
Union. The failure of the amendment process as a vehicle for
addressing the crisis that lead to our Civil War suggests cau-
tion about building into the constitutional structure poten-
tially insurmountable barriers against change. It was not the
persuasive force of reason but force of arms which gave the
abolitionist North sufficient power to impose the Civil War
Amendments on a defeated South.
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
erased from the Constitution the principle that one adult
male could legally own another, and see that ownership pro-
tected as a matter of constitutional right. They also estab-
lished the principal of equal treatment regardless of race, in
courts, legislatures and the voting booth. Yet, de jure dis-
crimination against people of color persisted until the middle
of this century. De jure discrimination against women domi-
nated family laws and policies until the last quarter of the
Twentieth Century and de jure discrimination against chil-
dren in every area of law still continues. American women,
after decades of struggle, ridicule and abuse, finally gained
the right to vote with ratification of the Nineteenth Amend-
ment, in 1920.67 To this day, gender equality remains a pale
half sister to racial equality, protected only by judicial inter-
pretations which apply "intermediate scrutiny" to measure
sex discrimination- a test far less stringent than the "strict
scrutiny" applied to race discrimination.6 As for children, the
U.S. Constitution seems to operate as an impediment rather
than an aid in developing a coherent concept of children's
rights- a concept now recognized worldwide.
As we have seen, judicial interpretation has provided a ve-
hicle for the creation of new rights that were too controversial
to surmount the amendment process. Does this make them
illegitimate? I think not, both as a matter of morality and of
pragmatics. Even the harshest critics of judicial activism
have never seriously advocated a return to plain meaning and
originalism because the consequences would be unthinkable
in an age which has come to accept formerly controversial
67 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIX ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex.").
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (articulating for the first time the
"intermediate scrutiny" standard in holding that "classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives").
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claims as self evident truths.' If we were to purge American
constitutional law of every doctrine or theory not grounded in
plain meaning or original intent, we would have to abandon.
not only those controversial cases protecting abortion and gay
rights," but also cases on racial and gender justice, family
privaV and fundamental liberty, which have become civic
icons.' If plain meaning were the test, we could no longer
rely on a host of textually suspect but absolutely pivotal legal
constructs, such as the "incorporation doctrine," which
makes the Bill of RiThts binding on the states as well as the
federal government.
Having become familiar with the detailed South African
document, I find it sobering to realize that Americans owe
their fundamental freedoms not to the express language of a
Constitution, but to this ad hoc process of missed moves,
power plays, tricky strategies, and creative lawyering. Yet
even doubters like Justices Scalia and Thomas have never se-
riously advocated a rigid adherence to plain meaning and the
original text because the consequences would be unthinkable
in an age which has come to accept formerly controversial
claims to individual dignity and equality- claims that never
could have commanded the super majorities necessary to
formal amendment- as self-evident truths.
On the other hand, the very qualities that permitted the
U.S. Constitution to grow and survive- the open textured
See Steven G. Calabresi. The Tradition of the Written Constltutlon: A Comment
on Professor Lessig's Theory of Translatfon, 65 FORDHAhi L. REV. 1435. 1449 (1997)
(observing that strict constructionists like Justice Scalla and Chief Justice
Rehnquist endorse many interpretations that conflict with orlginallsm).
70 See generally Romer v. Evans. 517 U.S. 620. 636 (1996) (invalidating an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution on the grounds that it -classifies homo-
sexuals not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone
else."); Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113. 154 (1973) (holding that -the right of personal
privacy includes the abortion decision").
See generally Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479. 485-86 (1965) (holding
that "the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms" are protected from government
regulation of contraceptives); Brown v. Board of Educ.. 347 U.S. 483. 493 (1953)
(holding that racial segregation in public schools -deprivels] the children of the mi-
nority group of equal educational opportunities").
72 Under modem incorporation doctrine, guarantees that are -fundamental" to the
judicial processes maintained in the United States may be Incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana. 391 U.S. 145. 149-50 n.14
(1967). Consider the even more astonishing -reverse incorporation theory.- which
Thurgood Marshall and his NAACP colleagues persuaded the Court could be used to
make the guarantees of equal protection, announced in 1868 in the Fourteenth
Amendment, binding on the federal government via the Fifth Amendment. ratified in
1791- an exercise of interpretive creativity which defies linear logic. See Boiling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1953) (noting that, while the Fifth Amendment does not
contain an equal protection clause. -the concepts of equal protection and due proc-
ess... are not mutually exclusive... discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process").
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language, the openness of the process to political and histori-
cal influence, the ad hoc process and context specific nature
of case by case adjudication- have been impossible to con-
trol. The lack of specificity about the scope and application of
rights and about methods of interpretation has allowed "lib-
eral or forward-looking" judges great freedom and has per-
mitted "conservative or backward-looking" judges, arriving
after the moment of constitutional transformation, to back-
slide on the promises of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment. As the story of the post-Reconstruction back-
lash illustrates, judicial activists have played a role in reading
new rights out of as well as into the Constitution.73 Courts
will continue to use constitutional interpretation to break
down the barriers between public and private, to reconfigure
institutions such as the family and the workplace according
to evolving constitutional principles, and to create new rights
and new rights-bearers. But sometimes judges will take the
interpretive process down dead ends and along pointless de-
tours, even going so far as to repudiate the principles which
provided the original textual point of departure.
Far more than explicit text, a mistaken or wayward inter-
pretation is always open to re-interpretation. For example,
Brown v. Board of Education74 overruled the interpretation in
Plessy v. Ferguson5 that the equality principle was satisfied
by facilities that were "separate but equal" and Reed v. Reed"
rejected prior cases such as Bradwelt v. Illinois,7 which lim-
ited women's equal participation in the public sphere. Often,
these re-constructions of constitutional meaning have in-
volved a re-balancing of competing rights. The traditional
rights of whites to choose with whom they associate and of
the patriarch to control all family decision-making, generally
accepted at one time, gave way to competing claims for
equality and freedom from people of color and from women.
Currently, a major challenge to the constitutional law of the
family in the United States is: whether the Constitution can
evolve through re-interpretation to include the notion, uni-
73 See infra text accompanying note 93.
74 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1953) (holding that "in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place").
75 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1895) (holding that "the enforced separation of the races...
neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his
property without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws,
within the Fourteenth Amendment").
76 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding that "Nto give a mandatory preference to either
sex over members of the other.., is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative
choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 137-39 (1872) (affirming the Illinois Supreme Court's
refusal to admit a woman to the bar).
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versally accepted in international law, that children are per-
sons with rights. I will show how the emerging notion of chil-
dren's rights has been blocked by backward-looking consti-
tutional interpretation, and I will suggest the time is here for
the U.S. Supreme Court, borrowing from the experiences of
the rest of the world, to re-interpret family rights to make
room for the rights of the child.
III. THE FAMILY IN U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The politics of the family has often been reflected in the
constitution of government. One of the Constitution's most
influential architects, John Adams, imagined that the legis-
lature would be a miniature of society. How right he was.
Each of society's injustices was reflected in the original
scheme of representation. When Adams' wife Abigail pro-
tested the exclusion of women, and asked that "the ladies" be
remembered by those meeting in Philadelphia, he scoffed at
the idea.
9
Adams's reaction and the U.S. Constitution's silence on
the topic of the family are not surprising. The rights of chil-
dren and family would never have occurred as a subject of
constitution-writing to the U.S. Constitution's drafters, since
they deemed these issues both "private" and "local." Private
and local issues were not on the agenda of the Constitutional
Convention, at which representatives of the thirteen original
states sought to create a stronger but still limited central gov-
ernment, while leaving local and state laws intact- except to
the extent they were superseded by enumerated federal pow-
ers. The framers used provisions such as the Necessary and
Proper Clause to suggest that judges should use their good
judgment in determining whether the exercise by the federal
government of its powers fell inside or exceeded proper con-
stitutional bounds.
See Letter from John Adams to John Penn (mar. 27, 1776). In 4 PAPERS OF JOHN
ADAMS 78, 80 (Robert J. Taylor ed.. 1979). In a private correspondence to John
Penn, Adams wrote "[als the Representative Assembly, should be an exact Portrait. in
Miniature, of the People at large, as it should think, feel, reason and act like them
great Care should be taken in the Formation of it, to prevent unfair, partial and cor-
rupt Elections." Id. at 80.
See Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (Mar. 31. 1776). In THE BOOK OF
ABIGAIL AND JOHN: SELECrED LErrERS OF THE ADAMS FAMILY. 1762 - 1784. 120. 121
(L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter SELECTED LM'rIERS]; Letter from John
Adams to Abigail Adams (Apr. 14, 1776) in SELECTED LETTERS 121. 122-23. In this
exchange of letters. Abigail Adams asks her husband to include women in their nas-
cent efforts of codifying laws; John Adams responds to this request by writing. "[als
to your extraordinary Code of Laws. I cannot but laugh." Id. at 122.
So U.S. CONSr. art I. § 8. cl. 18.
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Today, the dichotomy between private and public, rele-
gating family issues to local and state "private" as opposed to
"public" law, can no longer claim the unquestioned explana-
tory power and coherence it once enjoyed. The evolution of
constitutionalism worldwide has brought into the foreground
the important role played by families in the scheme of demo-
cratic government and by democracy in the governance of
families. Modern European constitutions explicitly discuss
family rights.8' Human rights treaties and conventions rec-
ognize the importance of the protection of families and chil-
dren.8 2  Still, the U.S. Constitution- although amended
twenty-seven times since 1789-makes no mention of the
words "family," "parent," or "child."
The first major appearance of family law in U.S. constitu-
tional doctrine dates to the late nineteenth century,8 when
Myra Bradwell sued the State of Illinois for denying her a li-
cense to practice law in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment stricture that no state shall deny "to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws." In Bradwell,
the Supreme Court upheld Illinois's disparate treatment of
Mrs. Bradwell, which the state court justified by noting that
as a married woman she could not enter into contracts or
manage her own property." Women and men naturally occu-
pied different spheres- women cared for the private sphere of
home and children while men went forth into the public world
of commerce, the professions and politics. In barring women
from the practice of law, Justice Bradley in his concurrence
asserted that Illinois simply recognized this reality.8 The
Court in Bradwell attributed constitutional meaning to the
Victorian model of family life, which concentrated authority
and control over all family members in the hands of the pa-
triarch.
81 See, e.g., Grundgesetz [Constitution] [GG] art. 6(1) (F.R.G.) (stating that
"[m]arriage and family shall enjoy the special protection of the state").
See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A)(III) arts. 16, §
3, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. (1948) (declaring that "[tihe family is the natural and funda-
mental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State").
See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
84 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
85 See Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 131. The Supreme Court chose to couch its
holding in more general terms: "the right to control and regulate the granting of fi-
cense to practice law in courts of a State is one of those powers which are not trans-
ferred for its protection to the Federal government ...." Id. at 139.
86 See id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring) ('The natural and proper timidity and
delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupa-
tions of civil life.").
[Vol. 2:1I
Dec. 1999] THE CONSITUFIONALIZATION OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 27
A. The Conservative Role of Substantive Due Process
I have described at length in other writings what I identify
as the problematic legacy of two other Supreme Court
cases- Meyer v. Nebraskd' and Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters- decided in 1923 and 1925 during the heyday of eco-
nomic substantive due process.o In these writings I trace the
relationship between substantive due process theory and
family rights, examining them in the larger historical context
of opposition to turn-of-the century social reforms. Meyer
and Pierce are revealed as an integral part of resistance by
conservatives to a large range of programs such as manda-
tory free public schooling, restriction of child labor, and ma-
ternal and infant health programs supported by progressives
and populists.
Substantive due process theory is one of the more bizarre
creations of the interpretive process. Around the turn of the
last century, conservative forces sought to use the Constitu-
tion as a shield against state regulation of business and
commercial activity. The architects of substantive due proc-
ess built an elaborate edifice of theory- based entirely on
interpretation and drawing heavily on external sources such
as the Magna Carta. They located virtually absolute protec-
tions of private property and rights of contract in the due
process clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth AmendmenL
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868,
reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citi-
zens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to an7 person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
The first sentence of this provision overruled Dred Scott, in
which the pre Civil War Court had concluded that ownership
of human beings was a constitutionally protected property
interest, and that African-Americans, although born in the
87 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
88 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
89 See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?': Meyer and
Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995 (1992).
9D See id. at 1070-80 (arguing that Justice McReynolds injected the Fourteenth
Amendment with a substantive due process theory of parental rlghts of control as a
result of his own, subjective political views and background).
91 U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
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U.S., could not be considered "citizens" within the meaning of
the Constitution. 92 Within a few years of its ratification, how-
ever, the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment, designed to ad-
vance racial equality and liberty, had been derailed by a post-
Civil War backlash. In The Civil Rights Cases, the Court In-
terpreted the Fourteenth Amendment's clauses on equality
and on privileges and immunities so narrowly they were use-
less in combating race-based injustices.93
Moreover, within a few decades, creative conservative ad-
vocates managed to build on the Due Process language of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits the state from de-
priving any person of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess, to create a new theory which limited congressional at-
tempts to enact socio-economic policy through legislation.
Due process, conservatives argued, had a substantive con-
tent: it enshrined the right to liberty and property, so firmly
rooted in history and tradition that they were essential to any
scheme of ordered liberty. These phrases often were short-
hand for vested economic rights. Their target and nemesis
was redistributive politics. Conservatives persuaded the
Court to adopt this theory to strike down all sorts of eco-
nomic legislation, on the ground that such regulation
amounted to a "deprivation of property" or "liberty" in viola-
tion of vested common law rights. Since the U.S. Constitu-
tion contains no limitations clause,94 it was a simple matter
for the Justices known as the Nine Horsemen to use the doc-
trine of substantive due process to block reasonable attempts
on the part of the New Deal to redistribute highly concen-
trated power of wealthy taxpayers and industrialists to meet
the needs of the unemployed, children, farmers and laborers,
and generally to mitigate the injustices of entrenched ine-
qualities of resources.
In the early nineteen-twenties, the battle lines were
sharply drawn. Because children were still widely perceived
as parental property, the claims of their parents that man-
datory schooling laws, health laws, and laws against child la-
bor infringed their vested common law rights fell neatly into
the paradigm of constitutional protection of property interests
and of patriarchal authority structures. While Meyer and
Pierce are now often described as cases about intellectual lib-
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 453 (1856).
See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (limiting protections of the Four-
teenth Amendment to race-based deprivations by the State, not by solely private
conduct).
94 See infra notes 110 & 166 and accompanying text describing the South African
Constitution's Limitations Clause, which places limits on the courts' powers to dero-
gate from certain rights.
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erty and family integrity, when placed in the context of their
times, they are revealed as closely linked to the line of eco-
nomic substantive due process cases. Although the New Deal
Court repudiated the limitations placed on Congress by the
Substantive Due Process doctrine with respect to economic
legislation, the court never overruled the line of personal sub-
stantive due process cases traceable to Meyer and Pierce.
The Court has continued to treat parents' rights to have
control of their children, which under common law were
merely correlatives of their responsibilities, as constitution-
ally protected personal liberties. Yet, as observed in the ap-
pellant's brief in Pierce, "it is a strange perversion of the
meaning of the word 'liberty' to apply it to a right to control
the conduct of others."9 To this day, history and "tradi-
tion"- which too easily translates into the powers historically
and traditionally enjoyed by free white men- has provided
the benchmark under substantive due process theory for de-
fining those personal "liberties" upon which the state may not
infringe. Emerging claims to new rights, by definition, will
fail the test of deeply rooted tradition.
Children's rights are such an emerging claim, challenging
American history and tradition but rooted in broad concepts
like liberty, equality, and especially dignity. Cases like Meyer
and Pierce protected the family unit from destructive state
intervention, but at a high price for children. The American
focus on parents' rights, rather than children's rights, made
children's status, and a constitutional theory of childhood,
especially difficult to bring to light. This fact has become
glaringly evident as Americans have failed to respond to in-
ternational pressures to acknowledge children's rights." Fi-
nally, the lack of an explicit "dignity" principle and of expan-
sive canons of interpretation hampers the natural growth of
children's constitutional rights. The difficulty of constructing
a theory of children's rights on the foundation of American
95 See. e.g.. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton. 515 U.S. 646. 654 (1995) (Tradi-
tionally at common law, and still today, unemancipated minors lack some of the
most fundamental rights of self-determination - including even the right to liberty in
its narrow sense .... They are subject, even as to their physical freedom, to the
control of their parents or guardians.").
Supplement to Brief of Appellant, the Governor of the State of Oregon at 8.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters. 268 U.S. 510 (1924) (No. 584) (arguing that the Four-
teenth Amendment is not so broad as to protect every right and 'llberty' belonging to
individuals); see also Woodhouse, supra note 89. at 1000-01 (rMeyer announced a
dangerous form of liberty, the right to control another human being.1: Symposium.
Developments in the Law, the Constitution and the Family. 93 HARV. L REV. 1156.
1353 (1980) (explaining that the constitutional right of parents to control their chil-
dren is unusual in that it protects the ability to control another person).
See infra note 151.
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constitutional doctrine arises in part from the fact that chil-
dren are different from adults, and our constitution deals
badly with real difference.98 It is complicated by the fact that
children are essentially dependent on adults, and the U.S.
Constitution deals poorly with dependency.' And, as Illus-
trated, it is complicated by the fact that children figured In
early constitutional cases on the family almost as a form of
parental "property," and control of children appeared as an
element of parental "liberty," both values which receive ex-
plicit recognition in the text of the U.S. Constitution. In ad-
dition, children have suffered from being on the wrong side of
the sharp line between public and private spheres drawn by a
Constitution that requires "state action" to trigger protections
of the Bill of Rights.
IV. THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION
South Africans and international legal scholars who lived
the events firsthand, and even took part in the drafting proc-
ess and in subsequent adjudications, will pardon my sins of
omission and oversimplification, since no brief description
could do justice to the complex social, political and cultural
forces which shaped the process."° Let me begin by describ-
ing the end product: a document that firmly entrenches gen-
der equality as a guiding principle, prohibits age discrimina-
tion, and explicitly protects the rights of children. This is not
to suggest that internal tensions are absent- there will be
many cases in which courts must harmonize or prioritize
competing rights."' Moreover, abstract rights are difficult to
98 See generally MINOW, supra note 17.
See generally Martha A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of
Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2205 (1995) ("In the societal division of the la-
bor among institutions, the private family bears the burden of dependency, not the
public state. Resort to the state is considered a failure.").
100 For discussions of the historical events and the constItution-building process,
see In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Afr., 1996, 1996 (4)
SALR 744 (CC); see also BASSON, supra note 26, at xix-xxxi; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
SOUTH AFRICA 2-1 to 2-15 (Matthew Chaskalson et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW]; Brice Dickson, Protecting Human Rights Through a Constitu-
tional Court: The Case of South Africa, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 531 (1997); Justice Rich-
ard J. Goldstone, The South African Bill of Rights, 32 TEx. INT'L L.J. 451 (1997); Daisy
M. Jenkins, From Apartheid to Majority Rule: A Glimpse Into South Africa's Journey
Towards Democracy, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 463 (1996); Makau wa Mutua,
Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse, 10 Harv.
Hum. Rts. J. 63 (1997); Adrien Katherine Wing & Eunice P. De Carvalho, Black
South African Women: Toward Equal Rights, 8 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 57, 76-77 &
nn. 155-164 (1995).
101 See ALBIE SACHS, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NEW SOUTIH AFRICA 79 (dis-
cussing tensions between protection of children from both parents and the state);
Yvonne Mokgoro, Traditional Authority and Democracy in the Interim South African
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translate into true equality.'°2 Yet, one fact remains dear:
children are specifically recognized in the text of South Af-
rica's Constitution as rights bearers with powerful claims for
justice. How was this revolutionary document produced?
In February 1990, negotiations between liberation forces
and the de KIerk government led to repeal of the ban on anti-
apartheid groups and the release of African National Con-
gress ("ANC") leader Nelson Mandela. In December 1991, the
Convention for a Democratic South Africa ("CODESA") began
negotiating the ground rules for a fully democratic election
and a new Constitution, a project continued by the Multi
Party Negotiating Process ("MNNP"). The parties invented a
two-phase process. First, they agreed upon an interim Con-
stitution ("IC"), adopted in November 1993.' This IC would
govern temporarily, while the nation held democratic elec-
tions. A Constitutional Assembly ("CA") consisting of the
democratically elected National Assembly and the Senate,
sitting jointly, would draft and approve by a two-thirds vote a
permanent Constitution. The IC, in effect, supplied the blue-
print for transition. More importantly, it provided a guaran-
tee to the white citizens, soon to become a minority, that the
formerly disempowered majority would respect certain agreed
upon principles in rewriting the Constitution. The IC created
an eleven member Constitutional Court with jurisdiction of
all constitutional questions, and stipulated that the perma-
nent Constitution would not take force and effect until the
Constitutional Court had certified its compliance with thirty-
four specific Constitutional Principles ("CP"). ' 04 These Con-
stitutional Principles, characterized as a "solemn pact" in the
Preamble to the interim Constitution, provided the key to a
process that has been described as a "revolution... negoti-
ated between the oppressor and the oppressed."'5 This proc-
ess irrevocably committed the country to "a non-racial, non-
sexist multi-party democracy with three tiers of government
and ajusticiable Bill of Rights."'06 As insurance against dero-
gation of rights by the elected representatives who would
Constitution, 3 REV. CONST. STUD. 60 (1996) (Special Issue published by Alberta Law
Review and Centre for Constitutional Studies in 1996) (discussing clash between
constitutional protections of traditional leadership and of gender and racial equality).
10 See generally Mutua, supra note 100, at 69 (citing the United States as an ex-
ample of rights rhetoric ultimately protecting the interests of the wealthy and pow-
erful).
1 S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC).
104 Id. at Sched. 4.
105 Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa Yvonne Mokgoro. Address to
Philadelphia School Children at University of Pennsylvania Law School. Phila.. Pa.
(Dec. 9, 1997); see also BASSON. supra note 26. at xxii.
106 BASSON, supra note 26, at xxiii.
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draft the final document, CP II stated, "everyone shall enjoy
all universally accepted fundamental rights, freedoms and
civil liberties, which shall be provided for and protected by
entrenched and justiciable provisions in the Constitution,
which shall be drafted after having given due consideration to
inter alia the fundamental rights contained in Chapter 3 of
this [interim] Constitution."0  The Constitutional Principles
protected rights of property, a matter of deepest concern to
affluent white South Africans who would now be a voting mi-
nority. They also guaranteed fundamental political, civil, and
due process rights, a matter of deepest concern to the libera-
tion movement whose members had suffered relentless state
persecution. In addition, Constitutional Principle III pro-
vided: "The Constitution shall prohibit racial, gender and all
other forms of discrimination and shall promote racial and
gender equality and national unity.""°  Although Constitu-
tional Principles II and III played a central role in the framing
of family-related rights under the final Constitution, there
were other Constitutional Principles which also had great
bearing: CP I required the Constitution to establish a demo-
cratic system of government committed to achieving equality
between men and women of all races; CP IV made the Con-
stitution the supreme law of the land, binding on all organs of
state at all levels of government; CP V stipulated that the le-
gal system shall ensure equality before the law and equity in
the legal process, regardless of race or gender; CP VIII pro-
vided for universal adult suffrage; CP XII preserved collective
rights of free association; CP XII preserved the institutions of
traditional leadership and indigenous law, but made them
subject to fundamental ights."°
Several other key features, while not given the status of
immutable principle, also made their appearance in the in-
terim Constitution. The first was a "Limitation Clause." Sec-
tion 33 of the IC provided that rights might be limited by laws
of general application, but only to the extent "reasonable" and
"justifiable in an open and democratic society based on free-
dom and equality" and only if the limitation did not "negate
the essential content" of the right."0 Certain rights, including
those to dignity, freedom and personal security; to religious
freedom, political rights and rights in detention; and chil-
dren's rights to protection from abuse, exploitative labor, and
to their rights in detention, were singled out for additional
107 S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), Sched. 4, Const. Princ. II.
08 Id. at Const. Princ. III.
109 See i at Sched. 4.
11 Id. at ch. 3, § 33.
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protection, and could be limited only if "necessary.""' The
limitations concept was borrowed, with adaptations, from
textual sources such as the Canadian Constitution, ' 2 the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms,1 3 and the German Constitution.1"4  The
"necessary" prong was compared, as well, to the U.S. Su-
preme Court's "strict scrutiny" test, but commentators were
quick to point out the differences between the South African
limitations provision and those of the systems from which it
was partially borrowed." 5
Second, the interim Constitution's Section 98(5) contained
a "suspension" provision, empowering the Constitutional
Court to declare a law unconstitutional, but allow it to re-
main in force during a specified period while the competent
authorities corrected the defect."6 To American readers, this
type of provision stands in sharp contrast to the absolute
messages of our own rights discourse. The provision created
the possibility of recognizing the existence of new rights,
while negotiating the terms of their realization.
Third, the interim Constitution cast the government in an
active rather than passive role in furthering rights. Chapter 8
established various bodies such as a Human Rights Commis-
sion and a Commission on Gender Equality, charged with
promoting a culture of human rights."7 In addition, Section
35 of Chapter 3 (Fundamental Rights) explicitly addressed
principles of "Interpretation," to be applied in construing the
provisions on fundamental rights." 8 Based on this provision
the interim Constitution appears to have endorsed what crit-
ics such as Justice Antonin Scalia have branded "judicial ac-
tivism" to the extent that the IC mandated a purposive or ho-
listic interpretation, rather than confining judges to the most
literal and narrow "grammatical" construction of the text's
original meaning at the time it was drafted."9  It instructed
"' Id.
112 CAN. CONST. (Constitutional Act. 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 1.
11 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Nov. 4, 1950. 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
114 GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 18 (F.R.G.).
11 See, e.g., BASSON supra note 26, at 51-53 (arguing that the limitations clause in
the South African constitution is not exactly similar to the clauses found in other
jurisdictions and comparative studies should be approached with caution).
116 SeeS. AFR. CONSr. of 1993 (IC). ch. 7. § 98(5).
117 See d. at ch. 8, § 115-20.
118 SeeicL atch. 3, § 35.
119 See State v. Makwanyane and Another. 1995 (3) SALR 391. 403 (CC) (sanc-
tioning a method of constitutional interpretation that "whilst paying due regard to
the language that has been used, is 'generous' and 'purposive' and gives expression
to the underlying values of the Constitution.") (internal citations omitted): see also
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the judge engaged in interpreting the text of the Chapter to"promote the values which underlie an open and democratic
society based on freedom and equality," and it further pro-
vided that courts "shall, where applicable, have regard to
public international law applicable to the protection of the
rights entrenched in this Chapter, and may have regard to
comparable foreign case law."1
2
1
With this interim Constitution in place, Nelson Mandela
was elected President of the "new South Africa" in April 1994,
the ANC captured over sixty per cent of the vote, the Consti-
tutional Court was chosen through a process also involving
significant citizen participation, the Assembly set to work,
and two years later issued a draft of the final Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa. The May 8, 1996 draft of the
new Constitution, submitted to the Constitutional Court by
the CA, was accompanied by over two thousand pages of
written submissions and followed by extensive oral argu-
ments. 2' While the Constitutional Court, by its judgment of
September 6, 1996, praised the text as complying with the
overwhelming majority of the requirements of the CP, the
court referred back to the CA for certain amendments to
conform to the Constitutional Principles. The amended text
of October 11, 1996 was certified by the Constitutional Court
on December 4, 1996, signed into law by President Mandela
on December 10, 1996, and went into effect in January 1997.
Five aspects of the South African experience stand out as
especially illustrative of how the process and the context in
which a document is drafted may influence both the form and
the substance of its text. First, the South African process
was extremely public. As a consequence, inherent tensions
may have been more likely to surface openly, although some
issues were still obscured with vague language, shifting to the
judiciary the task of resolving them. Second, the process
evolved in two phases, which created a species of "trial mar-
riage" during which the text of the interim Constitution could
be tested before the public and in cases brought before the
Constitutional Court. The example I will discuss below of
Lasser, supra note 17, at 723-26 (comparing grammatical modes of reading which
convey messages of stability with the purpose oriented readings which convey a
message of social responsiveness). Professor Anita Allen has analyzed the same
phenomenon in terms of "inward and downward looking" as opposed to "upward and
outward looking" modes of constitutional interpretation. See Anita Allen, Autonomy's
Magic Wand: Abortion and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 683, 692-93
(1992).
120 S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC), ch. 3, § 35(1).
121 See Goldstone, supra note 100, at 454.
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"horizontal rights" illustrates this phenomenon." Third, the
drafters consulted constitutional experts, borrowed models
from other constitutional systems, and treated international
human rights law as compelling authority in their project of
creating a comprehensive and inclusive catalogue of modem
rights. Section 72 of the interim Constitution required the
CA to appoint an independent panel of five recognized South
African constitutional experts to assist it in the process of
drafting-'2 "Indeed, the persons drafting the document
searched the world for more unusual models from which to
borrow."" Fourth, the drafters consciously sought (or were
pushed) to include the voices of politically disempowered
groups such as women and children, and they intentionally
borrowed from these "outsider" perspectives. 2 ' Fifth, the
drafters researched, borrowed, and embodied in written text
not only substantive constitutional principles, but also vari-
ous canons of interpretation and principles of application,
with an eye to entrenching not only the text itself but the
transformational spirit behind it.
An Explanatory Memorandum, which was adopted by the
CA and prefaces the text, states:
[Tihe process of drafting this text involved many South Africans
in the largest public participation programme ever carried out in
South Africa. After nearly two years of intensive consultations.
political parties represented in the Constitutional Assembly ne-
gotiated the formulations contained in this text which are an in-
tegration of ideas from ordinary citizens, civil society and politi-
cal parties represented in and outside of the Constitutional
Assembly. This text therefore represents the collective wisdom of
the South African people and has been arrived at by general
agreement.*
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This process also provided a voice to people formerly excluded
entirely from such high-level decision making, generating
both high excitement and (a risk that astute participants fully
understood) high expectations for results."
122 See infra notes 154 to 161 and accompanying text.
123 See S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC). ch. 5. § 72(2).
1 Dickson, supra note 100, at 537.
25 See Wing & Carvalho, supra note 100. at 77 n.162 & 90 (describing the protests
of the ANC Women's League demanding inclusion of women n CODESA negotiations
and the creation of the Women's National Coalition to lobby for changes during the
drafting process).
126 South African Constitutional Assembly. Explanatonj Memorandum (vIsited Nov.
19, 1999) <http://www.constitution.org.za/b34b/b34b_mem.htni>.
127 See Interview with Yvonne Mokgoro, Justice of the Constitutional Court of
South Africa, in Johannesburg, South Africa (Aug. 13. 1997) (observing that the
greatest challenge facing the new South Africa is the challenge of meeting its citizens'
high expectations for change, but also remarking that the right to be heard consti-
tuted a significant change and was greeted as a valued right n and of Itselfl.
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Here is how the Constitutional Court, in its September
1996 decision, described the process:
Numerous public and private sessions were held and a wide va-
riety of experts on specific topics were consulted on an ongoing
basis. In response to an intensive country-wide information
campaign, including public meetings and open initiations to the
general public, the CA also received numerous representations,
both oral and written.12
When the new text of the Constitution was submitted for cer-
tification, "because of the importance and unique nature of
the matter, the directions [issued by the Constitutional Court]
also invited any other body or person [besides political par-
ties] wishing to object to the certification to submit a written
objection."' Examination of the documents in the CA's on-
line archives illustrates the reach of this process. 30 Individu-
als, as well as political parties and NGOs contributed exten-
sively. A telephone hofline was created allowing any person
to submit oral comments, and information was disseminated
in all eleven of South Africa's official languages."' As the
Court explained, in order to achieve certification, the docu-
ment would have to entrench all "fundamental rights," and
thus the CA and the Justices were obliged to consider the
status of rights worldwide, to determine whether all those
rights generally deemed "fundamental" had been properly
entrenched in the new document.
1 32
The record suggests, at least to this observer, that the
consultative, open, two-stage process contributed to greater
specificity, both linguistically and analytically, in the text of
the final document. Explicit protection of "decisions con-
cerning reproduction," which in American doctrine wanders
like a lost child between theories of liberty, due process, fam-
fly privacy and individual autonomy, was clearly articulated
as a form of "bodily integrity" in Section 12 (Freedom and Se-
curity of the Person) of the new text of the 1996 Constitu-
tion.1-13 This process also permitted the Constitutional Court,
2 In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Ar., 1996, 1996 (4)
SALR 744, 782 (CC).
129 Id. at 783.
130 See South African Constitutional Assembly Home Page (visited Nov. 19, 1999)
<http://www.constitiutuon.org.za/> (including a searchable database).
131 See Interview with Yvonne Mokgoro, Justice of the Constitutional Court of
South Africa, in Johannesburg, South Africa (Aug. 13, 1997); see also South African
Constitutional Assembly Home Page (visited Sept. 18, 1999)
<http://www.constitution.org.za/> (including a searchable database of multi-party
submissions and reports).
132 See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of S. Ar., 1996, 1996
(4) SALR at 790.
1 S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2. § 12(2)(a).
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in its certification opinions, to comment contemporaneously
on the nature of the rights created in a manner that should
carry significant weight with lower courts and help future
Constitutional Courts ascertain the meaning of the rights in
the context of South Africa's transition to a racially neutral,
non-sexist democracy.
A. Inclusion of Rights for Children in the Republic of
South Africa's Constitution
The RSA Constitution contains the most explicit constitu-
tionalization to date of children's rights. It is no accident that
the South African Constitution singles out children for special
protections. One scholar suggested that, "the conception of
justice in periods of political change.., is alternately con-
stituted by, and constitutive of, the transition.... As a state
undergoes political change, legacies of injustice have a bear-
ing on what is deemed transformative." The transitional
moment in South Africa coincided with a transitional moment
for children worldwide and in Africa- the promulgation and
virtually universal acceptance of the 1989 United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child'35 and the 1990 prom-
ulgation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child.'3 Perhaps even more telling in situating children's
rights as part of South Africa's transformative agenda is the
fact that children played a central and highly visible role in
the South African struggle for dignity, freedom, and equality.
Participants in the national debate on rights emphasized the
debt owed by the nation to its youth, the sacrifices of youth in
the battle against apartheid and the destructive impact of the
apartheid system across every aspect of the lives and pros-
pects of the majority of the country's children.'3 Observers
emphasized how apartheid laws such as the Group Areas Act
and "influx contro laws forced parents to leave their children
in order to find work, forced children to leave their homes and
134 Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law In Political Transforrma-
tion, 106 YALE L. J. 2009. 2014 (1997).
13s Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25. U.N. GAOR. 44th Sess..
Supp. No. 49, at 167 U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989).
'African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. O.A.V. Doc.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990).
137 See Justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa Yvonne Mokgoro. Ad-
dress to Philadelphia School Children at University of Pennsylvania Law School.
Phila., Pa. (Dec. 9, 1997); see also Timothy J. Treanor. Relteffor Mandela's Children:
Street Children and the Law in the New South Africa, 63 FORDHmI L REv. 883. 893
n.67 (citing the 1994 conclusions of the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry into the
Effects of Public Violence on Children that apartheid had been -uniformly and pro-
foundly destructive" effects on children).
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seek survival on the streets.'m Enforced separation and ine-
qualities in safety, education, shelter and every other arena
stunted the mental growth of children of all races and
classes.
The struggle against apartheid engaged a generation of
children as active combatants as well as passive victims.
39
For those seeking to articulate a scheme of children's rights,
the brutality of children's experiences under apartheid and
children's status as freedom fighters provided a powerful mo-
tivating context. Albie Sachs, Justice of the Constitutional
Court of South Africa, observed "[t]he greatest abuse to which
South African children are subject today comes from the or-
ganized might of the state. Any charter of children's lights in
a democratic South Africa has to take this fact as a starting
point."14 In arguing for a child's right to play, Justice Sachs
pointed to a history in which children's "school grounds are
occupied by troops, when their courage is displayed not on
the sports field but in the torture chambers of the police."'4 '
In addition to those children jailed for political activism, large
numbers of street children, who should have been served by
a child protective system, were swept into criminal systems,
often in the same facilities as adult offenders, and detained
indefinitely for petty offenses.142 In his 1994 State of the Na-
tion Address, President Mandela specifically highlighted the
plight of street children and children in detention and com-
mitted national resources to meeting their needs.
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Children also played a direct role in the creation of a chil-
dren's rights agenda during this transformational moment.
In May and June 1992, the International Summit on the
Rights of Children in South Africa brought together over two-
hundred children between twelve and sixteen, representing
all races and classes and all regions of South Africa. This
congregation drew up and adopted a "Children's Charter of
South Africa" and demanded the right to a children's council
of representatives in any future governments. The Charter
concludes: "Children will no longer remain silent about their
138 See generally Treanor, supra note 137, at 892-95,
139 See generally id. at 891-98 (describing the root causes and psychological tolls of
the problem of street children in developing countries in general and South Africa in
particular); UNICEF & NATIONAL CHILDREN'S RIGHTS COMM., CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN
SOUTH AFRICA: A SITUATION ANALYSIS (1993).
140 SACHS, supra note 101, at 79.
141 Id. at 81.
142 See Treanor, supra note 137, at 909-10 (describing the treatment of children by
the criminal justice system in apartheid South Africa).
143 See i. at 918 (citing Nelson R. Mandela, State of the Nation Address (May 24,
1994)).
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rights, but will speak and even shout out about their needs
and demands." '44 In response to pressures for representation
of children, a special Committee on Youth composed of chil-
dren and adolescents was formed to represent the young in
policy-making.'"
As an illustration of the birthing of children's rights, and
of the process by which rights became more particularized
during the transition from interim to Final Texts, consider
Section 30 of the interim Constitution, found in Chapter 3.
Fundamental Rights.
Children
30. (1) Every child shall have the right-
(a) to a name and nationality as from birth;
(b) to parental care;
(c) to security, basic nutrition and basic health and social
services;
(d) not to be subject to neglect or abuse: and
(e) not to be subject to exploitative labour practices nor to
be required or permitted to perform work which is hazard-
ous or harmful to his or her education, health, or well-
being;
(2) Every child who is in detention shall, in addition to the rights
which he or she has in terms of section 25 [rights of detained
persons], have the right to be detained under conditions and to
be treated in a manner that takes account of his or her age.
(3) For the purpose of this section a child shall mean a person
under the age of 18 years and in all manners concerning such
child his or her best interest shall be paramount. 14G
Section 30 of the IC far exceeds rights afforded to children
under the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretations of the U.S.
Constitution, protecting not only "negative" or "first genera-
tion" rights but also "socio-economic" or "second generation"
rights" Although rights to socio-economic benefits are gen-
144 international Summit on the Rights of Children in South Africa. The Children's
Charter of South Africa, May 27 - June 1, 1992 In Eric Atmore. Submission to the
Constitutonal Assembly Theme Committee (visited Nov. 12. 1999)
<http://www.constituton.org.za/form.htn-> (searching the entire collection with the
search string "intemational summit on the rights of children-). The Children's
Charter includes all of the rights adults often include in their formulations, but the
spirit and emphasis is different is many subtle ways, with a greater focus on chil-
dren's direct participation in decision-making.
145 See Vannessa De Jongh, The President's Award Committee (visited Nov. 12.
1999) <http://www.constitution.org.za/form.html> (searching the entire collection
with the search string "Youth Committee).
146 S. AFR. CONST. of 1993 (IC). ch. 3. § 30.
147 See supra text accompanying note 26.
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erally qualified in international instruments depending on
available resources, Section 30(1)(c) has been interpreted by
some South African scholars as having established a priority
in favor of children: when government and the judiciary are
confronted with competing claims to economic resources,
children may claim a priority which the judiciary would be
bound to apply in concrete cases."~ This section of the IC ul-
timately became Section 28 in the New Text. I will use un-
derlining to indicate additional concepts or details not found
in the earlier IC text.
Children
28. (1) Every child has the right-
(a) to a name and nationality from birth;
(b) to family or parental care, or to the appropriate alter-
native care when removed from the family environment:
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services
and social services;
(d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or
degradation;
(e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices;
(1) not to be required or permitted to perform work or pro-
vide services that -
(i) are inappropriate for a person of that child's-age; or
(ii) place at risk the child's well-being, education,
physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or social
development;
(g) not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, In
which case, in addition to the rights a child enjoys under
sections 12 [Freedom and security of the person] and 35
[Arrested, detained, and accused persons], the child may
be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of
time, and has the right to be -
(i) kept separately from detained persons over the age
of 18 years; and
(ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that
take account of the child's age:
(h) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the
state, and at state expense, in civil proceedings affecting
the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result-
and
(i) not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be pro-
tected in times of armed conflict.
148 See iUL at 48.
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(2) A child's best interests are of paramount importance in every
matter concerning the child.
(3) In this section "child" means a person under the age of 18149
years.
Section 30 and its successor Section 28 draw upon a
number of comparative and international law sources, in-
cluding "the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the
Child ... and, pre-eminently, the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child."'o The U.N. Children's Rights
Convention is the most rapidly and universally accepted hu-
man rights document in the history of international law,
having been adopted before its tenth anniversary by every
nation save two: Somalia, which currently lacks a function-
ing government, and the United States of America.'" The
enumeration of rights to name and nationality, to parental
care, to social rights, to representation of counsel, and to
legislative and judicial decisions that prioritize the interests of
children, all bear a strong resemblance to principles of the
UN Convention. Beyond that, the South African Constitution
has other striking features including: the detailed rights ac-
corded to children in detention, the specific provisions re-
garding "family care" for children separated from their par-
ents, and the right to counsel at public expense for children
not only in criminal, but also in civil cases.'o As Americans,
we maintain idealized images of our own children as precious
objects sheltered from adult cares. We balk at the notion of
children's autonomy, seeing it as a threat to our own rights,
and regard poor and especially incarcerated children as
149 S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 28.
150 CONSIrrrTIONAL LAW, supra note 100, at 33-1.
151 Within four years of its adoption by the United Nations General Assembly. 136
nations had ratified the Convention and another 23 signed the convention. See Tre-
anor, supra note 137, at n. 146. Presently 140 nations have signed the Convention
and 191 countries have become a party to the Convention. See United Nations. 11
Convention on the Rights of the Child (visited Oct. 19. 1999)
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/fnal/ts2/newsfles/partboo/iv..boo?lv.._l .html
>. UNICEF also reports that the United States has signed the treaty. but failed to
ratify it, while Somalia has neither signed nor ratified it. See UNICEF. Status: The
First Nearly Universally Ratified Human Rights Treaty In Hlston (visited Sep. 28.
1999) <http://www.unicef.org/crc/status.htm>.
At latest report, Senator Jesse Helms, powerful Chair of the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Committee, had notified Secretary of State Madeline Albright that he would
fight any attempt to place the Children's Convention on the Senate's agenda. See
David P. Stewart, Ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 5 GEo. J.
ON FIGHTING POVERTY 161, 165 (1998) (In a letter dated May 1. 1997. echoing earlier
statements of concern, Senator Helms... reiterated his request that the Convention
not be sent to the Senate for its advice and consent.... (citing Letter from Senator
Jesse Helms, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to Madeline K. Al-
bright, Secretary of State (May 1, 1997) (on file with the Department of State)).
See S. AP_ CONSr. of 1996, ch. 2, § 28(1)(b). g, (h).
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"other people's children," alien and dangerous, who are by
definition "delinquents" and "criminals."" While such atti-
tudes permeate all societies that have historically been di-
vided by class and color, the constitutional rhetoric of the
new South Africa explicitly commits all South Africans to
sustaining and protecting all children. Unlike American law,
which provides for diluted Due Process rights for children,
the South African provisions single out children in detention
for heightened due process rights reflecting the unique role
played by children who were front line fighters in the battle
against apartheid.
B. Jurisprudential Specificity: Textualizing the Concepts of
Horizontality, Suspension, Limitation and Interpretation
The South African experience led to the textualizing of ju-
risprudential concepts that the U.S. Constitution has left
largely to judicial interpretation, including the fundamental
topic of methods of interpretation. The interim Constitution's
text, as noted earlier, resolved many of these issues explicitly.
However, the IC was ambiguous on one crucial question:
whether the Bill of Rights was binding only on government
entities or whether it also bound private citizens.' In Ameri-
can constitutional theory, rights, other than those stemming
from the Thirteenth Amendment and certain very narrow ex-
ceptions to the Fourteenth Amendment, are generally inter-
preted as restraints on government, not on private action. 5
In order to sustain a constitutional rights claim, the individ-
ual must show a causal connection between "state action"
and harm to a constitutionally protected interest. South Afri-
can scholars approach this issue with different terms and
through a different lens. In the words of the Constitutional
Court, "'the term 'horizontal application'.., indicates that
those rights also govern the relationships between individu-
als, and may be invoked by them in their private disputes'
while 'the term 'vertical application' is used to indicate that
the rights conferred on persons by a bill of rights are in-
tended only as a protection against the legislative and execu-
tive power of the state in its various manifestations. '""'
153 See W. NORTON GRUBB & MARVIN LAZERSON, BROKEN PROMISES: How AMERICANS
FAIL THEIR CHILDREN (1982).
154 See Dickson, supra note 100, at 548-49 (discussing whether the IC had any
horizontal effect or intentions); BASSON, supra note 26, at 15-16.
15 See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (requiring state action to
trigger the protection of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, but finding that
judicial enforcement of a private racially restricted covenant constitutes state action).
1 Delisa Futch, Du Plessis v. De Klerk: South Africa's Bill of Rights and the Issue
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Lower courts and South African scholars were divided on
whether the interim Constitution did or did not envision
"horizontal application" of the various enumerated funda-
mental rights.' In May 1996, the Constitutional Court, bor-
rowing its analysis from the German Constitution's model,
declined to find that rights under Chapter 3 of the interim
Constitution must be given direct horizontal effects.'s The
new text, however, appears to authorize horizontal applica-
tion in certain situations. For example, Section 8(2) states
that "[a] provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a ju-
ristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking
into account the nature of the right and the nature of any
duty imposed by the right."' 59 Moreover, the 1996 Constitu-
tion also requires courts, in the absence of statutory law, to
develop common law to give effect to fundamental rights."W
While the Court will certainly be called upon to "interpret"
this language, and may yet interpret it narrowly, some ob-
servers see it as a significant strengthening of the Bill of
Rights. Horizontality has major ramifications for developing
emerging rights because it erodes the wall of separation be-
tween "public" and "private" and prompts critical scrutiny of
relationships rooted in common law and tradition."'
The 1996 Constitution also clarified provisions regarding
the Interpretation and Limitation Clauses noted earlier in my
discussions of the interim Constitution. The new section on
interpretation reads as follows (changes from the interim
Constitution indicated by underlining):
39. (1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or
forum -
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignily, equality and
freedom;
(b) must consider international law; and
(c) may consider foreign law.
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum
of Horizontal AppUcation, 22 N.C.J. INTrL L. & CON1. REG. 1009. 1010 (1997) (quoting
Du Plessis v. De Klerk 1996 (3) SALR 850, 861 (Cc)).
157 See id. at 1011 ("After the interim Constitution went into effect. South Africa's
lower courts reached different conclusions on whether the Bill of Rights was hori-
zontally applicable.).
15 See Du Plessis v. De KIerk. 1996 (3) SALR 850. 877-88 (CC).
59 S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 8(2).
10 Id. at ch. 2. § 8(3)(a).
161 See generally CONSrurONAL LAW. supra note 100. at 10-35 to 10-42 (describ-
ing the potential to over-apply rights that are horizontally enforced and the effect
that the limitations clause will have on this legislation).
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must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of
Rights.u
These two changes are significant. The active form "must
promote" replaces the more passive formulation "shall have
regard to" in the IC version. While a right to dignity had been
expressly protected in a section of the IC Bill of Rights, the
New Text elevates dignity to a level on par with the key prin-
ciples of equality and freedom. Scholars expect the Court to
further clarify the content of "dignity", which, at its broadest,
could be interpreted to encompass the entire range of human
rights, including the socio-economic rights essential to
achieving human dignity. The Constitutional Court has not
gone so far, but in its landmark case S. v. Williams it con-
cluded that laws permitting the whipping of juveniles as
punishment for criminal infractions violated the right to hu-
man dignity.'63 In another landmark case, S. v. Makwanyane,
the Constitutional Court held the death penalty unconstitu-
tional.'" In her concurring opinion Justice O'Regan ex-
plained:
The importance of dignity as a founding value of the new Con-
stitution cannot be overemphasised. Recognising a right to dig-
nity is an acknowledgment of the intrinsic worth of human be-
ings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of
respect and concern. This right therefore is the foundation of
many of the other rights that are specifically entrenched in chap
3 .... [H]uman dignity is important to all democracies. In an
aphorism coined by Ronald Dworkin, "Because we honour dig-
nity, we demand democracy."
1
6
The Limitations provision in the IC was also modified In
the 1996 Constitution, and now reads:
36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only In
terms of law of general application to the extent that the limita-
tion is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic so-
ciety based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into
account all relevant factors, including -
(a) the nature of the right;
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose;
and
162 S. AFR. CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 39 (modifying S. AFR. CONST. of 1993, ch. 3, §
35).
163 See 1995 (3) SALR 632, 657-58 (CC); see also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note
100, at 17-8 (discussing S. v. Williams).
164 See 1995 (3) SALR 391 (CC).
1 Id. at 507, paras. 328-30 (O'Regan. J., concurring).
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(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. ' w
The new text gives courts more explicit guidance regarding
the factors to be considered in evaluating whether a limita-
tion is "reasonable and justifiable." However, this
reformulation significantly changed key parts of the 1993
text. First, missing from the new text is the concept that
limitations could not "negate the essential content of the right
in question."' 67 Second, section 36 of the new text omits the
two-tier scheme of section 33 of the interim Constitution, in
which certain rights could be limited only on a showing that
the limitation was "necessary." The two-tiered formulation
had provoked significant controversy. Some critics objected
to the creation of a hierarchy of rights, and had suggested
that this skated dangerously close to the American model of
rational basis/strict scrutiny developed via judicial prece-
dents. '6 Critics observed that these American precedents
had failed to bring clarity to U.S. law and would not provide a
workable guide for South Africa, iven the different histories
and cultures of the'two systems.
'6 -
This Part has provided a thumbnail sketch of the process
of creating a South African Bill of Rights and of how children
were for the first time added to the list of rights-bearers. In
the South African scheme, children are given a set of spe-
cially defined rights beyond those enjoyed by "everyone." It
seems clear that children's rights are viewed as part of a
transformative agenda. Many aspects of children's rights in
South Africa can be traced to the participation of children in
the transitional struggle to defeat apartheid and in the proc-
ess of constitution-building that followed. As a result, chil-
dren's rights are now explicit and justiciable, and children are
empowered by procedural protections of their rights and by
their inclusion in a detailed constitutional scheme which en-
courages purposive and holistic interpretations of those
rights.
V. A COMPARISON CASE: DESHANEY V. WINNEBAGO COUNTY
DEPAR7hENT OF SOCIAL SERVICFS
To illustrate the differences between the two constitutional
166 S. AmR CONsT. of 1996, ch. 2, § 36(1) (modifying S. AFR. CONST. of 1993. ch. 3. §
33).
167 S. AFPR. CONST. of 1993. ch. 3. § 33(1)(b).
168 See CONSTrrnrMONAL LAw. supra, note 100. at 12-8 to 12-9.
169 See iU. at 12-10 (lIThe different histories of the countries and the arguably dif-
ferent philosophies underlying the respective Constitutions militate against adopting
the American standards of review when analysing cases under the Limitations
Clause.").
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schemes as they address claims of children, consider the case
of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-
ices, decided in 1989 by the U.S. Supreme Court. 70 I will de-
scribe first how it unfolded under U.S. constitutional princi-
ples and then how a similar case would play out under the
RSA Constitution. 1
7
Joshua DeShaney, as a four-year-old child, had been
brutally beaten by his father, suffering severe brain damage
that left him profoundly retarded. The relief sought by his
representatives was an award of damages against the County
Department of Social Services charged with responsibility
under state law for investigating and responding to allega-
tions of child abuse. The hospital authorities and Social
Services had temporarily detained Joshua after he was
brought to a hospital emergency room with suspicious inju-
ries, but had concluded they did not have sufficient evidence
to detain him further. Winnebago Social Services assigned a
social worker to make periodic visits to Joshua's home. Al-
though the caseworker observed a growing list of alarming
circumstances that clearly warranted removal, the social
worker allowed the child to remain with his father."' The
constitutional claim was based on the substantive due proc-
ess theory that the County's failure to protect Joshua De-
Shaney, despite evidence that he was being abused, deprived
the child of liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 The Court rejected this claim,
first holding that the Constitution conferred no right to gov-
ernment protection against private violence. 7 4 It also rejected
Joshua's second argument, that in assigning a social worker
to monitor his case the County had entered into a "special
relationship" with Joshua, creating an affirmative duty to
protect him from danger. " ' Joshua relied on cases like
Youngberg v. Romeo,176 in which the Court found that the
substantive due process component of the Fourteenth
Amendment required the government to provide a safe envi-
ronment for inmates in a mental hospital. However, the
170 See 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
1I recognize that I will be treading on shaky ground in attempting to apply South
African law, since constitutional and procedural concepts rarely translate seamlessly
from one idiom to another. But perhaps the exercise will evoke a response from
South African scholars more attuned to the nuances of their law than this outsider.
17 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192-93.
173 Id. at 195.
174 See id. ("[Nlothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the
state to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by pri-
vate actors").
175 See ic. at 197-200.
176 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
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Court distinguished Youngberg and similar prisoners' rights
cases as limited only to persons actually in the coercive
physical custody of the State."r This case was different, ar-
gued Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, because
Joshua was not in state custody.
While the State may have been aware of the dangers Joshua
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did
it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them. That
the State once took temporary custody of Joshua does not alter
the analysis, for when it returned him to his father's custody, it
placed him in no worse position than that in which he would
have been had it not acted at all.... The most that can be said
of the state functionaries in this case is that they stood by and
did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more ac-
tive role for them. In defense of them it must also be said that
had they moved too soon to take custody of the son away from
the father, they would likely have been met with charges of im-
properly intruding into the parent-child relationship. charges
based on the same Due process Clause that forms the basis for
the present charge of failure to provide adequate protection.17
This brief excerpt reveals the highly contingent nature of
the Court's perspective and of the public/private dichotomy
on which it relied. In what sense did Joshua inhabit a "free
world," since it was state law and state authorities that had
placed him in the legally enforceable control of his abuser?.
Why does the Court assume there would be state action if the
State removed the child from his father's custody, but not
when the State returned him to the father's custody after his
hospitalization?
In fact, Justice Rehnquist was correct that existing con-
stitutional precedents would have provided Joshua's father
with a justiciable substantive due process claim had the
authorities removed Joshua from his father's care or declined
to return him when his father brought him to the emergency
room. Under current jurisprudence, the fact that interven-
tion was in the best interest of the child is not sufficient to
sustain it or to insulate the State from liability. Following pa-
rental rights doctrines laid down in cases like Santosky v.
Kramer," the State must prove by clear and convincing evi-
1 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200 (distinguishing Youngberg 457 U.S. at 315-17.
stating, "it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act
on his own behalf- through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar re-
straint of personal liberty- which is the 'deprivation of liberty' triggering the protec-
tions of the Due Process Clause).
178 Id. at 202-03.
179 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the
fundamental liberty interests of natural parents in the -care, custody. and manage-
ment" of their children).
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dence that the child is at imminent risk of serious physical
harm in order to remove him from his father's custody. State
intervention in disregard of parents' rights- for example,
gross negligence in veriIying the facts of a report before inter-
vening-will trigger a constitutional claim by the parent.
After DeShaney, the imbalance between protecting the rights
of children and the rights of parents is even more pro-
nounced. American constitutional law maintains traditional
disincentives for over-intervention and under-intervention Is
cost free, since the victim of the State's failure to act cannot
state a justiciable claim. Passionate dissents from Justices
Brennan and Blackmun made many of these points, and
American constitutional scholars stretched to find creative
arguments within the framework of American constitutional
law that might provide a remedy for Joshua and others like
him.180 Attempts to reconstruct constitutional law to recog-
nize a child's substantive due process rights to bodily integ-
rity and to cast these as positive rights to state protection
from an abusive parent are invariably caught between the
rock of "tradition" and the hard place of "state action."
Birthing children's rights will not be easy. Opponents will
point to American constitutional traditions that have long
recognized parental rights over children, (including a parent's
right to administer corporal punishment) and have given
great weight to adults' rights of privacy and autonomy, while
denying or diluting such rights when claimed by children.
The DeShaney case would be approached very differently
under South African law. The text of Section 28(1) of the
Constitution would provide a clear starting point, stating that
"every child has the right... (d) to be protected from mal-
treatment, neglect, abuse or degradation."18 In interpreting
this text, a judge must bear in mind the injunction in Section
7(1) and (2) that the "Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democ-
racy in South Africa" and that the "state must respect, pro-
tect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights."' 82 In
addition, Section 39 mandates that:
180 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "inaction
can be every bit as abusive of power as action, that oppression can result when a
State undertakes a vital duty and then Ignores It"); id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (arguing for a more "sympathetic" reading of the Fourteenth Amendment
that "comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion
need not be exiled from the province of judging"): see also Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel
Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992) (arguing that the DeShaney case Is more effectively
addressed by the Thirteenth Amendment than by the Due Process Clause).
181 S. AFP- CONST. of 1996, ch. 2, § 28(l)(d).
182 Id. at § 7(1) - (2).
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(1) [wlhen interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or fo-
rum (a) must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and free-
dom; (b) must consider international law, and (c) may consider
foreign law [and] (2) when developing the common law or cus-
tomary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.1
The term "dignity," as discussed earlier, is closely associated
with notions of bodily integrity, and by singling out children
as subjects of special concern, the Constitution suggests that
"the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" include a
shifting of priorities towards protecting children as among the
most vulnerable and powerless of the citizens who suffered
under apartheid. A finding that state authorities have no
duty of care towards children who are not yet in state cus-
tody, but whom the state specifically knows to be at risk,
would negate the meaning of Section 28(1)(d), making it no
different from other rights of bodily integrity accorded to all
persons in state custody, including children. Not surpris-
ingly, given its text, its context, and the wider purposes and
spirit of the Bill of Rights, South African scholars have inter-
preted the right to protection from abuse as "'aimed against
executive or administrative action or legislation which ren-
ders children vulnerable to neglect or abuse.' Thus a child in
the position of Joshua DeShaney would succeed in a South
African court. " "
The story would not end here, however, since Joshua
would also have a protected right "to family care or parental
care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from
the family environment.""' Under this formulation, the right
to family relationships is conceptualized from the child's per-
spective as a right of the child. In balancing the child's dual
rights to family care and state protection from abuse, the
court is instructed by Section 28(2) that "a child's best inter-
ests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning
the child."' In civil cases involving removal under 28(l)(h)
the child most likely would be entitled to an attorney at state
expense," since substantial injustice would result to the
" Id. at § 39(1) - (2).
1 CONSTIUTONAL LAW, supra note 100, at 33-8 (quoting Azhar Cachalla et al..
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS INTHE NEW CONSTTUTION 102 (1994) and suggesting that a state
actor must exercise -reasonable professional Judgment" in investigating and acting
upon evidence of abuse).
,5 S. AFR. CONST. of 1996. ch. 2, § 28(I)(b).
'8 Id. at § 28(2).
8 Id. at § 28(1)(h) (mandating the assignment of a state funded legal practitioner
in civil matters affecting children where "substantial injustice would otherwise re-
sult).
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child (and to his family) not only if the child were returned to
a dangerous environment, but equally if the child were
wrongfully separated from his parents for any significant
length of time.
Various "loop holes" might well allow a South African court
to limit Joshua's right to protection from abuse or to suspend
a finding of violation pending state attempts at remediation.
While these principles of limitation and suspension have
aroused serious concern, they do provide courts with alter-
natives that reduce incentives to give tortured interpretations
of the constitutional text in an effort to deny the very exis-
tence of a right.
Finally, what difference, if any, would the South African
language addressing horizontal application make to Joshua's
case? There are significant differences between the American
perspective on state action and the German principles on
which the South African drafters drew for their models. Ar-
guably, Section 8 means that private individuals have a duty
of protection analogous to that imposed on the state actors.
Under this interpretation, friends, neighbors, and "innocent
bystanders" would be transformed into what American stat-
utes call "mandatory reporters," legally obligated to report In-
cidents of abuse.
South African courts would also be obligated to transform
the common law of custody in order to give effect to children's
rights to protection from abuse and to have their best inter-
ests considered paramount. Traditions rooted in parental
property rights would be discarded, despite their pedigree,
since the Constitution clearly aims to strike a new balance
that respects the rights of all persons to human dignity and
equality, including that of children.
VI. CONCLUSION
Both the American and South African experiences provide
cautionary tales and constructive insights that may prove
useful to those who advocate the incorporation of children's
rights into the scheme of constitutional law. Bombarded by
attacks from domestic critics of "family rights," who see them
as a judge-made elitist contraption with no grounding in the
text of the document, it is heartening for American propo-
nents of the doctrine to see how strongly and specifically the
expansive principles of family autonomy and privacy, gender
equality, procreational rights, and children's rights, so em-
battled here at home, are reflected in the most up to date of
constitutions.
The specificity of the South African text, one hopes, will
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help to prevent the backlashes and judicial backsliding that
characterize American experiences following periods of rights-
building. In contrast to the U.S. Constitution, whose drafters
left us wrangling endlessly over the legitimacy of interpreta-
tional models, the South African Constitution includes de-
tailed instructions on how the text should be read and ap-
plied. While these provisions may not resolve all future
interpretational dilemmas, at least they explicitly encourage
judges to embrace opportunities for constitutional growth and
to avoid the traps of excessive formalism.
In those transitional moments when a constitution is be-
ing created, its authors seek the most up-to-date version of
human rights consistent with their own cultural life. At such
times, the door is thrown open to explicit incorporation of
emerging rights. In established constitutional schemes, such
as that of the United States, recognition of emerging rights
depends on a robust belief among judges and the people in
the legitimacy of judicial interpretation. Judges must ap-
proach the written document as a "living" thing, not only
open to interpretation, but positively designed to grow
through judicial interpretation. Neither the amendment pro-
cess nor the democratic process alone can provide meaning-
ful avenues for growth and renewal when the emerging claims
are those of isolated minorities or even of numerical majori-
ties who have been systematically excluded from power.
I began this paper, as I begin my seminars on children's
rights, by noting that the United States Constitution nowhere
mentions children. I was intrigued recently when one of my
students told me I was mistaken, and pointed to the Pream-
ble of the Constitution. "Doesn't it say right here in black
and white that its purpose is 'to Secure the Blessings of Lib-
erty to ourselves and our Posterity?'" I couldn't help but
smile, even as I formulated a Socratic rejoinder. Is the Pre-
amble binding law? Or merely a guide to textual interpreta-
tion? What does the term "liberty" mean in this context: only
those liberties contained in the text that follows the Preamble,
or novel liberties undreamed of by its framers? What good is
liberty to children, anyway? And who is this "posterity" of
which the framers speak? Taken literally, it could mean the
adult descendants of the ratifiers, our present day Daughters
of the American Revolution and Society of Colonial Dames. If
that narrow interpretation strikes you as absurd, explain how
the framers possibly could have believed their "posterity"
would include the children of African slaves and immigrants
of every color and class. These quibbles aside, I would like to
believe that my student got it right. The framers chose those
words to instruct us in our duty to use the document they
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created for posterity as well as for the specific ends they had
in their limited field of view. They believed in liberty as a
value in search of perfection, not as a static definition of ex-
isting rights. Under this interpretation, we must find a way,
within the American constitutional scheme, to explore the
concepts of liberty, equality, and dignity as applied to persons
of all ages and capacities, and we will secure these blessings
to all Americans, including our children.
